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What Lies Beneath:
Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority,
and the Case of Originalism
Christopher J. Peters *
It is a surprising fact of American constitutional practice that we
cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional interpretation.
What can explain our disagreement? Is it the product of a deeper,
principled dispute about the meaning of constitutional law? Or is it
just a veneer—a velvet curtain obscuring what is really a back-room
brawl over political outcomes?
This Article suggests that these, in essence, are the only viable
possibilities. Either we disagree about interpretation because we
disagree (or are confused) about constitutional authority—about why
the Constitution binds us in the first place; or we disagree because
we disagree politically about the particular results of using one
methodology versus another.
This Article contends that methods of interpretation must be
defended by reference to accounts of constitutional authority. It
takes as its case in point the family of interpretive approaches known
as originalism, which favors resolving constitutional issues according
to a meaning fixed at the Framing. Originalism is an apt case study
because it currently is ascendant in both academic theory and
judicial practice and, not incidentally, because it often is suspected of
being a cover for controversial political commitments.
This Article illustrates the relationship between interpretation
and authority by assessing the “natural rights” defense of an
originalist Constitution offered by the influential New Originalist
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Randy Barnett. Barnett’s account fails, the Article contends, because
it cannot explain the authority of the Constitution it purports to
justify. But its failure underscores the centrality of authority to
methods of interpretation.
The Article then examines three general accounts of
constitutional authority that might be thought to entail originalism.
Accounts based on “consent” or “popular sovereignty,” while
rhetorically appealing, lack any basis in the realities of modern
society. Accounts based on what the Article terms “Moral
Guidance”—the supposedly superior wisdom of the Framing
process—are both descriptively implausible and conceptually
problematic. Only accounts based on “Dispute Resolution,” such as
the well-known “Footnote Four” approach from the Supreme
Court’s Carolene Products decision, can overcome the fatal flaws of
these other accounts. But Dispute Resolution can support only a
selective, modest use of originalism.
Originalists, then, are left with a choice, the Article concludes.
They can moderate their interpretive methodology as the Footnote
Four approach suggests. Or they can insist on thoroughgoing
originalism—with nothing to back it up but the bare desire for
politically controversial results.
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I. INTERPRETATION AND DISAGREEMENT
Here is a remarkable fact. Americans live under the most
successful written constitution in history, a document that over
more than two centuries has survived civil war, endured tumultuous
debates over race and regulation and rights and the role of
government, inspired countless imitations around the world, and
earned the nearly religious reverence of citizens rich and poor, urban
and rural, natural-born and naturalized, Republican and Democrat.
And yet we cannot agree on the seemingly fundamental question of
how that document should be interpreted.
Our disagreement is not just an academic one, though it thrives
in academic circles. It is both real and important: real, in the sense
1253
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that actual constitutional decision-makers are swept up in it; and
important, in the sense that some of those decision-makers are
Justices of the United States Supreme Court.
Consider two influential books by current Justices. Antonin
Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation is a “New Originalist” manifesto, a
typically merciless (but far from humorless) battle cry on behalf of
“original meaning” interpretation. 1 Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty is
a spirited defense of a flexible, adaptable “living Constitution” that
reads like a reply brief to Justice Scalia despite never mentioning
Scalia by name.2 These are men whose job it is to render binding
interpretations of the Constitution, and yet they could hardly
disagree more fundamentally about how that job should be
performed.
It is relatively rare for sitting Justices to defend their
methodology at length and in public, as Justices Scalia and Breyer
have done. But it is common for clashes of methodology to decide
constitutional cases, or at least to be deployed as if they will decide
them. Roe v. Wade, probably the most contentious Supreme Court
decision since Dred Scott, pitted what would now be called the “living
constitutionalism” of Justice Blackmun against the textualism of
Justice White and the originalism of Justice Rehnquist. 3 (Living
constitutionalism won that round.) NFIB v. Sebelius, the recent

1. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 37–39
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, Common-Law Courts].
2. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J., for the Court):
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however, . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution. . . .
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
See also id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting) (“With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the
language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. The Court simply
fashions and announces a new constitutional right . . . .”); id. at 171, 174 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the Scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the
Amendment.”).
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“Obamacare” case, matched the increasingly vehement originalism
of, respectively, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas against the levelheaded pragmatism of Justice Ginsburg. 4
(Point to the originalists.) There are far too many other examples to
list.
We have managed to squeak by for more than two hundred years
without a consensus approach to constitutional interpretation.
Perhaps our interpretive disagreement even deserves some credit for
this: no single approach dominates, so everyone’s preferred approach
is always in play. Still, it is profoundly strange that we agree so
broadly that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land but
diverge so widely on how to determine just what that law requires of
us.
I will not attempt the Sisyphean task of resolving that
disagreement in this Article. But I will try to construct (perhaps to
excavate) a framework around which the components of a resolution
might be assembled. I will contend that methodological debates
must first be carried out as foundational debates about the
Constitution’s authority—about why the Constitution we are
interpreting binds us in the first place. Interpretive methods
presuppose accounts of constitutional authority. So we should focus
on the question of authority before we enter the methodological fray.
Answering the question of authority may solve the problem of
interpretation for us—or at least make the outlines of that problem
more clear.
I also will evaluate the reasonably plausible attempts to answer
the authority question, the question of why the Constitution
obligates us. I will find all of them wanting in some ways and most
of them wanting in ways that are fatal. And I will suggest that a

4. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (Roberts, J., for the
Court) (“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. . . .”)
(emphasis in original); id. at 2642, 2644 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If
this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the failure to maintain minimum essential coverage. One
might argue that it regulates that failure by requiring it to be accompanied by payment of a
penalty. But that failure—that abstention from commerce—is not ‘Commerce.’”); id. at 2677,
2677 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I adhere to my view that ‘the very
notion of a “substantial effects” test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the
original understanding of Congress’ powers . . . .’”); id. at 2609, 2616 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Consistent with the Framers’ intent, we have
repeatedly emphasized that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is dependent upon
‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual experience.’”).
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persuasive approach to interpretive methodology must be built upon
the most promising account of authority. If methodology doesn’t
follow authority, then it is deeply flawed methodology. Perhaps
worse, it is methodology that can only be defended as a means to
generate the interpreter’s preferred results.
I will frame my arguments here around a particular family of
interpretive methodologies that usually travel under the name
originalism. I use originalism as my case in point for several reasons.
First, originalism is ascendant; it may not yet dominate the bench,
and it certainly doesn’t dominate the academy, but its star
undeniably is on the rise. So in focusing on originalism, I am
focusing on a subject of considerable contemporary interest.
Second, largely for the first reason, there is far more good recent
writing about originalism (pro and con) than about any competing
methodology, giving me a great deal of material to work with.
Third, contemporary originalist theory features enough
commonality that it makes sense to consider “originalism” as a
relatively cohesive approach—much more so than the various
nonoriginalist methods sometimes lumped together under the label
“living constitutionalism.”
And I must admit to a somewhat discreditable fourth reason. As
a nonoriginalist, I have long labored under the suspicion that
originalism is driven by outcomes rather than the other way
around—that, to quote the pugnacious title of an article by a fellow
nonoriginalist, “originalism is bunk,” 5 a sophistic and increasingly
sophisticated attempt to put constitutional lipstick on a nakedly
political pig. I doubt that I am alone among nonoriginalists in my
skepticism. This Article presents an opportunity to prod and test
that skepticism a bit, by examining what might lie beneath
originalism other than political opportunism.
My conclusions do not validate my skepticism, exactly. But they
don’t entirely dispel it either.
I begin in Part II by introducing, tentatively, the relationship
between interpretive methodology and constitutional authority. I
present a “Cynical Narrative” of originalism, one that shamelessly
indulges my skepticism about its motivations. Then I examine the
account of constitutional authority and its connection to originalism
offered by Randy Barnett, a prominent New Originalist. I argue that
5. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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Barnett’s account is, at bottom, no more than a deeply theorized
version of my Cynical Narrative. And I use this contention to
demonstrate originalism’s (or any methodology’s) need for a good
underlying theory of authority.
In Part III, I defend further the claim that authority is central to
methodology. After defining my subject more carefully, in a way that
takes account of the New Originalists’ distinction between
constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction,” I
argue that interpretive approaches must be consistent with some
theory of constitutional authority as a practical matter. And I explain
why the claim made by Lawrence Solum, another New Originalist,
that interpretive questions are in part non-normative does not
threaten the authority/interpretation connection I am trying to draw.
Having made a prima facie case for an intrinsic relationship
between interpretation and authority, I devote the remainder of the
Article to presenting, and critically assessing, three general accounts
of constitutional authority that might plausibly lead towards
originalism. If any of these accounts both succeeds as a justification
of constitutional authority and entails originalism, then we have a
viable alternative to the jaundiced Cynical Narrative of originalism’s
underpinnings. But if no plausible account of constitutional
authority also entails originalism, then the Cynical Narrative
becomes more credible.
In Part IV, I contend that the related concepts of consent and
popular sovereignty, which sometimes are offered by originalists in
support of their approach, cannot persuasively justify the authority
of our Constitution or, probably, of any other constitution in the
circumstances of modern political life.
Part V tackles a considerably more nuanced attempt to justify
constitutional authority that I call a Moral Guidance account. A Moral
Guidance account locates authority in the supposedly superior
wisdom of some aspect or aspects of the constitutional process, such
as the Framing. In a certain form, it entails a strong version of
originalism. But it also faces serious obstacles, some contingent on
the circumstances of our actual Framing, some more conceptual and
universal. I argue that these obstacles render Moral Guidance
accounts implausible as justifications of constitutional authority and
thus as defenses of originalism.
Finally, in Part VI, I examine a very different way of justifying
constitutional authority, which I call a Dispute Resolution account.
1257
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Dispute Resolution accounts attribute authority to the Constitution,
not because its procedures are especially wise, but because they are
especially fair or determinate and, as such, are capable of avoiding or
resolving certain kinds of disputes that ordinary democracy cannot
avoid or resolve. The best-known example of a Dispute Resolution
account is the “representation reinforcement” approach suggested by
the famous Footnote Four of the Carolene Products decision and later
elaborated by John Hart Ely. I argue that this Footnote Four
approach is viable as an account of constitutional authority—more
viable, in any event, than its competitors. I also argue, however, that
the Footnote Four approach supports at best a selective, modest
form of originalism.
In Part VII, I conclude that because constitutional interpretation
and constitutional authority are joined at the hip, originalists face a
choice. They can accept a moderate form of originalism, which is the
only kind justified by a plausible theory of constitutional authority.
Or they can insist on thoroughgoing originalism, with no normative
warrant other than the bare desire for politically conservative results.
II. ORIGINALISM, VALUES, AND AUTHORITY
Let’s begin with a surprisingly difficult question. What exactly
would be wrong with an approach to constitutional interpretation—
say, originalism—that can be defended only as a means of
implementing certain politically controversial results?
This Part answers that question by deploying the conceptual
mechanics of constitutional authority—of the Constitution’s capacity
to bind us. I introduce the concept of authority by posing a thought
experiment involving a “Cynical Narrative” of originalism’s
motivations, and then juxtaposing that thought experiment with the
sophisticated and provocative New Originalist theory of Randy
Barnett. Barnett’s theory fails to make sense of constitutional
authority, I explain, and yet a good account of authority is required
to debunk the Cynical Narrative. Originalism, or any interpretive
methodology, must come to grips with the question of authority.
Before going any further, however, I need to define with more
care the “originalism” to which I will be referring throughout the
Article.
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A. “Originalism”

Originalism is a type of answer to the fundamental, persistently
unresolved question I referenced in my introduction, the question of
interpretive methodology: how should courts (or other interpreters) go
about the task of determining whether and how the Constitution
applies to particular issues or disputes? Over the past quarter
century or so, as Barnett proudly (and I think accurately) reports,
originalism “has thrived like no other approach to interpretation” in
American constitutional theory and practice. 6 But what exactly is
“originalism?”
Both the core and the boundaries of originalism are contested, by
originalists and by their critics; 7 and, like most commonly used
terms that invoke complex and disputed concepts (“democracy,”
“the rule of law,” “family”), no doubt “originalism” often is used
carelessly. It probably is impossible to define “originalism” in a way
that is consistent with every careful use of the term, much less with
every careless use of it. But we need not attempt that impossible
project. For purposes of this Article, I will use “originalism” in the
following rather general sense:
Originalism holds that the application of the Constitution to an issue or
dispute should be determined, to the extent possible, by its meaning at the time of
framing or ratification.
I think this definition is a fair statement of the common ground
that unites most contemporary originalists. 8 Within the spacious

6. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMM. 257, 257 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping Precedent].
7. See, e.g., infra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
8. In gaining some understanding of contemporary originalism and in fashioning this
very general definition, I am indebted to the work of Lawrence Solum, who is both one of the
leading theorists of contemporary originalism and a tireless chronicler of the movement. Solum’s
paper “Semantic Originalism,” available only in draft form and online as of this writing, contains
an extensive discussion of the history and current state of originalist thought, including points
of dispute within originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 13–27 (Nov. 22,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [hereinafter
Solum, Semantic Originalism].
I believe the general definition I offer in the text is consistent with Solum’s intricate
attempt to define the core of originalism in “Semantic Originalism,” though it is far from
coextensive with it. Solum offers the following statement of what he calls “Pure Normative
Originalism”: “Constitutional practice should be substantially guided by the original public
meaning of the text.” Id. at 30. The general statement I use here is similar to this and not
inconsistent with it, though there are at least two differences. First, Solum specifies the meaning
of the Constitution as “the original public meaning,” which rules out “original intent” positions.
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margins of this general definition, of course, lurks much
disagreement. 9 For example, originalists disagree on how to
determine the “meaning” of the Constitution at the time of its
framing or ratification (and thus on whether “framing” or
“ratification” is the operative event). Some originalists would
determine original meaning by looking for the “intent” of the
Framers; 10 others look for the meaning that would have been
attributed by a reasonable member of the public at the time the
document was ratified (the “original public meaning”). 11
Originalists also disagree on how often the meaning of the text will
be underdeterminate 12 and, when it is, on how to “construe” the
This is entirely consistent with Solum’s arguments regarding the semantic meaning of the
Constitution, but for my purposes I want to include original-intent positions within the realm of
the “originalism” I am examining.
Second, Solum’s statement requires “constitutional practice” to be “substantially guided
by” original public meaning. I take “constitutional practice” to be shorthand for “the application
of the Constitution to an issue or dispute,” as I phrase it in my definition. See id. at 29
(describing “constitutional practice”). It seems possible, however, that constitutional practice
might be “substantially guided by” original public meaning without being “determined, to the
extent possible” by that meaning, as my definition requires. In this sense Solum’s statement of
“normative” originalism might be less demanding than my definition.
9. In briefly enumerating in the following text some of the points of disagreement
among originalists, I will cite a few examples of each position; but I refer the reader to Solum’s
work for a far better understanding of contemporary originalist theory than I can provide here,
including citations to important statements and critiques of originalism. See Solum, Semantic
Originalism, supra note 8; see also Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism, LEGAL
THEORY
BLOG
(last
revised
Feb.
19,
2012),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/ legal_theory_le_1.html [hereinafter
Solum, Originalism].
10. Leading statements of this “original intention” position include Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1977); Edwin Meese III, United States Attorney General, Speech Before the American
Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47–54
(Steven G. Calabresi, ed. 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM].
11. This appears to be the consensus position among originalists as of this writing.
Prominent expositions include ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–85 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA]; Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992); SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1;
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127 (2003); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT,
LOST CONSTITUTION]; and Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws,104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994).
12. See Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY
BLOG,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-le.html
(last
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text to resolve the issue at hand despite this underdeterminacy.13
They disagree on the extent to which original meaning (when it is
determinate) contributes to the content of constitutional law: on
whether original meaning is all there is to constitutional law, 14
whether original meaning is part of constitutional law but not all of
it, 15 or whether original meaning might become part of
constitutional law but need not do so. 16 And they disagree on other
matters as well.
The substance of these various disagreements need not concern
us, however. Nothing significant in my arguments will turn on
particular resolutions of these disputes or on other intricacies of
originalist thought. Where differences within originalist theory
might be relevant to what I have to say, I will try to note that fact.

updated Dec. 23, 2012) (“Old Originalists seemed to believe that the original intentions of the
framers fully determined the translation of the constitutional text into the correct set of legal
rules: interpretation could do all the work.”). By “Old Originalists,” Solum seems to have in
mind many or all of the theorists listed supra note 10. I would add to this list a progenitor of the
so-called New Originalism, which looks not to original intent but to original public meaning:
Antonin Scalia, who often writes or speaks as if the project of identifying original meaning is all
there is to the application of the Constitution to particular disputes. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil].
13. For originalist descriptions of the phenomenon of textual underdeterminacy, see
Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 67–75; BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note
11, at 118–21. For a survey of differing originalist approaches to the project of “constitutional
construction”—the application of the text when its original meaning runs out—see Solum,
Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 75–79.
14. Solum believes that “no actual proponent of originalism has endorsed this extreme
position.” Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6. But “Old Originalist” beliefs that
original meaning “can do all the work,” see supra note 12, seem to assume this position. If
correctly identifying original meaning is capable of completely resolving all constitutional issues,
one way or another, then original meaning just is constitutional law: there are no constitutional
rules or commands other than those specified by original meaning.
15. This “moderate” position is the one necessarily assumed by Solum and other New
Originalists who agree that constitutional “construction” is required to resolve issues once
original meaning runs out. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6–7, 67–75. It also
is the position taken by originalists who believe the Court should presumptively defer to (at
least some) nonoriginalist precedents.
16. This “weak” position is taken by those who believe that constitutional law qua law is
created by judicial decisions, not by the sources relied upon by judges in making those decisions.
See id. at 7–8, 8 n.26 (citing as an example Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and its
Discontents, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 08-07, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103569).
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B. Originalism: A Cynical Narrative
With the concept of originalism thus loosely defined, allow me
to introduce the relationship between constitutional interpretation
and constitutional authority with a brief thought experiment.
Imagine that someone presents to you the following supposedly
descriptive account of originalism: 17
The Cynical Narrative
Contemporary originalism began in the 1970s, not as a
principled theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather
as a politically conservative device to critique liberal Warren
Court and early Burger Court decisions 18 like Roe v. Wade,
Griswold v. Connecticut,19 and Miranda v. Arizona. 20
Originalism was a natural vehicle for this critique: it
combined an appeal to patriotism and historical nostalgia
(well-timed to coincide with the 1976 Bicentennial) with a
popular sense that the Court had overreached in many of
these cases.
These early critical uses of originalism, designed as they were
primarily for rhetorical purposes, were superficially appealing
to those who shared the political commitments of their
proponents but also, not surprisingly, were undertheorized.
The first wave of originalists failed to carefully think through
the conceptual mechanics of “original intent”—whose intent
mattered, how it should be identified, what mental states
counted as “intent,” and so forth. They also neglected to
offer any account of originalism’s normative underpinnings
besides a vague promise of “judicial constraint.” 21 These and

17. This account is a cynical version of the much-more-charitable (or sympathetic)
history offered in Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 13–27. I don’t intend to present
this account as fact. But I think it is a plausible interpretation of fact, and so, in presenting the
Cynical Narrative, I will cite actual sources that might be used to support such an interpretation.
18. Classic uses of originalism in this conservative-critical vein include the sources cited
supra note 10, as well as BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held that married couples have a
constitutional right to use contraceptives, thus setting the stage for later “right of privacy”
decisions including Roe.
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda applied the Fifth Amendment to hold that
confessions by criminal defendants can be admitted as evidence only if certain warnings were
administered prior to interrogation.
21. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 12, at 863–64; BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra
note 11, at 4–5. The “judicial constraint” rationale is of course not original with modern
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other shortcomings made the “Old Originalism” a relatively
easy target for the counterattacks that came from the (mostly
liberal) legal academy in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. 22
During the same period, however, conservatives were gaining
more power in national politics and thus, eventually, among
the judiciary, including on the Supreme Court. Ronald
Reagan’s election in 1980 brought a new, conservative Chief
Justice, William Rehnquist, and the appointment as
Associate Justice of Antonin Scalia, who would become a
flagbearer of originalism. From 1980 through 2010, seven of
the eleven new Justices were appointed by Republican
presidents. These Justices had an incentive to develop
originalism as an apparently principled ground for
overturning liberal Burger Court, Warren Court, and perhaps
even New Deal precedents. They were aided and abetted in
this endeavor by the formation in 1982 of the Federalist
Society, 23 an organization of conservative law professors and
students that lent academic credibility and intellectual
firepower to the effort to rehabilitate originalism.
The result was the “New Originalism”—a better-theorized
attempt to patch the holes in the old version. 24 New
originalists. Chief Justice Taney famously used it in his infamous opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, the 1857 decision holding that slaves, former slaves, and their descendants could never
be citizens of the United States and that Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in the
territories:
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or
impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or lawmaking power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution.
The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best
lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its
true intent and meaning when it was adopted.
60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857).
22. Among the most important early examples are Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33–71
(1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1985).
23. See ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 1 (citing 1982 as the date the Federalist Society was
formed). The Originalism book is a collection of reprinted speeches by leading lights of
contemporary originalism, combined with the transcripts of panel discussions held to celebrate
th
the Society’s 25 anniversary in 2007.
24. “New Originalism” and “New Originalists” are terms sometimes used to describe a
loosely defined school of theory that has arisen during the past generation or so and that is
largely responsible for the move away from “original intention” originalism and toward its
“original public meaning” iteration. See, e.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 18–
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Originalists replaced the problematic quest for “original
intent” with the seemingly more concrete notion of “original
public meaning.” 25 And they began to devise deeper
normative theories to support originalist methodology. 26
They held conferences, wrote books and articles, and earned
chairs and named professorships at elite law schools. Most
importantly, their work began to bear the fruit of significant
results on the Court, such as 2008’s District of Columbia v.
Heller, an originalist-to-the-bone decision that recognized for
the first time an individual right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment. 27
But the New Originalism, like the Old, remains a stratagem
for imposing politically conservative values in the guise of
constitutional interpretation. Nowhere is this more evident
than in what New Originalist Randy Barnett has called
originalism’s
“special
difficulty
with
precedent.” 28
Originalism is no different from any other methodology in
the conflict it presents with existing Court decisions that it
concludes are wrongly decided. Yet originalists tend to

19. Although I will use these labels as convenient shorthand in this Article, I do so somewhat
reluctantly, as they remind me of the following exchange from the movie This Is Spinal Tap:
Marty: Let’s . . . talk a little bit about the history of the group. I understand, Nigel,
you and David originally started the band . . . was it . . . back in 1964?
David: Well, before that we were in different groups. I was in a group called The
Creatures . . . which was a skiffle group.
Nigel: I was in Lovely Lads.
David: Yeah.
Nigel: And then we looked at each other and says well, we might as well join up, you
know, and uh . . . .
David: So we became The Originals.
Nigel: Right.
David: And we had to change our name actually . . . .
Nigel: Well, there was . . . another group in the East End called The Originals, and
we had to rename ourselves.
David: The New Originals.
Nigel: The New Originals. And then, uh, they became . . . .
David: The Regulars. They changed their name back to The Regulars, and we thought,
well, we could go back to The Originals, but what’s the point?
THIS IS SPINAL TAP (MGM 1984).
25. See sources cited supra note 11; see also Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at
18–19.
26. See Solum, Originalism, supra note 9.
27. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
28. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6, at 262.
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obsess about stare decisis. 29 This is because originalism is
caught between the Scylla of its true raison d’être—as a
device for overturning liberal precedents—and the Charybdis
of those few nonoriginalist precedents (e.g., Brown v. Board of
Education) 30 with which even originalists cannot bear to part.
(No surprise, then, that many originalist theorists conclude
that Brown should not be overturned while insisting, almost
in the same breath, that Roe must be.) 31
Originalism, in short, is a cynically instrumentalist
philosophy. It reflects not a good-faith attempt to derive the
actual meaning of the Constitution, but rather a politically
motivated effort to overturn liberal results and impose
conservative ones.
29. Examples of ink spilled, and lecture halls filled, by originalists on the topic of stare
decisis include the following. Ink spilled: Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6; Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Gary
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Gary
Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 803 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism]; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34
(2003); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the
Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006). Lecture halls filled: Panel on Originalism and
Precedent, in ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 199–252.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court explicitly rejected originalist methodology
in invalidating mandated racial segregation in public schools under the Equal Protection Clause.
31. To my knowledge, the first originalist to argue that Brown was in fact correctly
decided—that racial segregation was in fact contrary to original meaning or original intent—was
Michael McConnell. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1995). McConnell’s arguments swim upstream against a strong consensus of
historical and legal scholarly opinion. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 117–33; Alfred Avins, De

Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, 38 MISS. L.J. 179 (1967); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881
(1995). Nonetheless, his conclusion has been endorsed in a number of subsequent originalist
writings, always without independent historical analysis. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra
note 6, at 260; McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 842–43.
Even originalists who reject McConnell’s conclusion that Brown was rightly decided as an
originalist matter (or who suspend judgment on that conclusion) often conclude for other
reasons that it should not be overturned. See, e.g., Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 6;
McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 837–41; Lash, supra note 29, at
1469–71; Strang, supra note 29, at 480–82. Many of these same originalists insist that Roe should
be overruled. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29, at 840–41; Lash,
supra note 29, at 1469–71; Strang, supra note 29, at 482–84.

1265

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

Having read this Cynical Narrative, imagine that you are a
committed originalist. (Perhaps in fact you are one.) Would you be
(are you) offended by the Narrative? Would you (do you) find
something insulting, perhaps even threatening, in its implications?
Would you be (are you) motivated to refute it as best you could
(can)?
Now suppose that the Cynical Narrative turns out to be true. So
what? Would its truth be grounds to doubt originalism if you are an
originalist? To criticize it if you are not?
The fact is that few if any originalists accept, much less promote,
the Cynical Narrative. Few originalists defend their approach as a
way to implement politically conservative (or any other particular
kind of) results. But in many, perhaps most, cases, the results
originalists claim for their methodology coincide with results that
political conservatives would approve (or at least would find more
palatable than the alternatives). Most originalists claim Roe was
wrongly decided; most political conservatives disapprove of an
abortion right. Many people in this country consider themselves
political conservatives; politicians appeal openly to their views as a
matter of course. Why then have originalists not used the attainment
of conservative results as an explicit justification for their
methodology?
The most likely intuitive reaction to the Cynical Narrative, I
believe, is that it is borderline defamatory if false and deeply
problematic for originalism (perhaps even disqualifying of it) if true.
Intuitively, there is something very wrong with staking one’s
preferred approach to constitutional interpretation entirely on the
achievement of certain politically controversial outcomes.
I think this intuition is correct, and that the implications of its
correctness are important. To explain why, I begin with a rare and
refreshing exception to the rule: a thoughtful originalist who does in
fact defend his approach as a way to implement politically
conservative—to be completely accurate, politically libertarian—
results. I’m referring to Randy Barnett.

C. Barnett’s Libertarian Constitutional Theory
Barnett defends originalism as an implication of his account of
constitutional authority. “The Constitution . . . is a piece of
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parchment under glass in Washington, D.C.,” he notes. 32 “Why
should we pay any attention to it?” 33 Barnett agrees that, as I will
argue in Part IV, this question cannot satisfactorily be answered with
the notion that we have consented to be bound by the Constitution. 34
Instead, he contends, legitimate constitutional authority ultimately
depends on whether the system of laws established by the
Constitution is substantively just, or at least “not unjust.” 35 And he
asserts that justice consists of certain “natural rights” that protect
liberty. 36 “[I]f a constitution contains adequate procedures to
protect these natural rights, it can be legitimate,” he says. 37
As it happens, Barnett argues, the Framers also believed in these
libertarian natural rights and “incorporated effective procedural
protections of these rights into the Constitution.” 38 The
Constitution as created by the Framers, then, is legitimately
authoritative, according to Barnett; it is authoritative because
obeying it will promote the libertarian rights it was designed to
protect. And so to determine the meaning of that Constitution, we
ought to be bound by what it was that the Framers actually created.
This requires interpreting the Constitution, in the first instance, by
looking for “the meaning [its words] had at the time they were
enacted.” 39

32. BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 9.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 11–31.
35. Id. at 9; see id. at 32–52.
36. See id. at 53–86.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 53; see id. at 53–86.
39. Id. at 90; see id. at 89–117. “In the first instance,” because Barnett recognizes that
there will be no identifiable, determinate original meaning with respect to many constitutional
questions. See id. at 118–21. Where a determinate original meaning cannot be identified, Barnett
supports constitutional “construction”: the judicial creation of a constitutional meaning “that is
consistent with its original meaning but not deducible from it.” Id. at 121; see id. at 118–30. I
discuss this “interpretation”/“construction” distinction in Part III.A, below.
I should note here that Barnett’s leap from the premise that the Constitution is legitimate
because it protects natural rights to the conclusion that the Constitution must be interpreted
according to its original meaning is too hasty, for at least two reasons. First, the (legitimate)
Constitution created by the Framers might contemplate nonoriginalist interpretation. The use of
vague terms like “freedom of speech” and “due process of law,” for example, might be
delegations to subsequent interpreters to define constitutional meaning by evolving standards
rather than according to original meaning. Second, if it is the protection of natural rights that
gives the Constitution its legitimacy, then the best method of interpretation is the one that best
protects natural rights—even if doing so requires departing from original meaning in some
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Barnett’s approach thus presents originalism as an entailment of
an account of constitutional authority—as an implication of the
reason why the Constitution binds us in the first place. And Barnett
justifies constitutional authority as a means of promoting particular
substantive values, in the form of libertarian “natural rights.”
For our purposes here, there are two interesting features of
Barnett’s account. One is its suggestion that we need to explain
constitutional authority before we can understand constitutional
methodology. The second is the particular explanation of
constitutional authority he offers—an explanation grounded in the
pursuit of certain (undoubtedly controversial) outcomes or values. In
exploring why this second feature of Barnett’s account is flawed, we
can begin to see why the first feature must be correct.

D. Values Imposition, Content-Independence, and Authority
The problem with Barnett’s account of constitutional authority is
that it is not really an account of constitutional authority at all. It can
neither justify nor motivate obedience to the Constitution.
The concept of authority is among the most elusive in legal
philosophy. 40 For present purposes, we can define authority as
follows:
Authority is the capacity to impose a moral obligation of obedience to
whatever agent or norm possesses it.
If constitutional law possesses authority, then those subject to it
(legislators, executive-branch officials, citizens, judges) have, for that
reason, a moral obligation to obey it. If constitutional law lacks
authority, those subject to it may have reason to obey it—the fear of
sanctions for disobedience, for example—but they lack a moral
obligation of obedience.
There are three key operative distinctions underlying the concept
of authority. The first is between authority and mere coercion. If we
attribute real authority to law, we recognize an obligation to obey it

instances (where, for example, the Framers’ understanding of natural rights was defective).
We can put these objections to one side for present purposes, however. The important
points here are, first, that Barnett’s defense of originalism derives from his account of
constitutional authority, and second, that Barnett’s account of constitutional authority hinges on
certain substantive outcomes or values (“natural rights”).
40. For a thorough exploration of its problematics, see Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002).
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even absent a meaningful threat of sanctions for disobedience. As
H.L.A. Hart observed, our attitude toward valid legal commands
differs from our attitude toward the orders of an armed gunman. 41
We view the former as authoritative, as legitimately binding, and
thus as imposing an obligation to obey even without the teeth of
sanctions. We view the latter as illegitimate and thus as merely
coercive, not authoritative.
The second key distinction is between the kind of obligation
imposed by authoritative law on the one hand, and a garden-variety
reason to act on the other. If we recognize a law as valid, we treat it as
more than just another factor relevant to our process of deciding
how to act. The facts that it is dark and rainy outside are reasons to
drive slowly; the fact that the law sets a speed limit imposes an
obligation to drive slowly. While it is implausible that this obligation
is absolute and indefeasible, 42 it must at least have greater
normative force than most other relevant reasons for action.
A closely related third distinction, and the one most relevant for
present purposes, is between a reason or obligation to act that is
content-dependent and one that is content-independent. 43 A contentdependent reason is a reason to attribute a certain moral status to an
action—to conclude, for example, that the action is morally
obligatory on the one hand or morally prohibited on the other. The
facts that it is dark and rainy outside are content-dependent reasons
to drive slowly; they are reasons to attribute a certain moral status
(moral desirability, perhaps even moral necessity) to the act of
driving slowly. A content-independent reason, in contrast, is a
reason to take or refrain from a certain action regardless of one’s
beliefs about the moral status of that action. The fact that the law
imposes a speed limit is a content-independent reason to drive
slowly; it is a reason to take that action without regard to whether
we believe the action is morally desirable or morally necessary.
As this example suggests, legal authority requires contentindependence. The obligation to act that the law imposes on us must
be independent of the moral status we attribute to that action; the
law must be capable of obligating us to take actions we (otherwise
41. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82–91 (2d ed. 1994).
42. On this point, see CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS, A MATTER OF DISPUTE: MORALITY,
DEMOCRACY, AND LAW 33–36, 44–47 (2011).
43. For a reasonably clear explanation of content-independence, see Shapiro, supra note
40, at 389.
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would) think morally incorrect or suboptimal or wrong,—that is,
actions we otherwise would conclude we should not take. If we have
an obligation to obey the law only when it tells us to do the morally
right thing, then the supposed authority of the law is illusory: our
obligation is to obey the requirements of morality, not those of the
law. Only if we have an obligation to obey the law even when it is
wrong—even when it requires us to do something other than what
morality dictates—does the law really possess authority over us.
This requirement of content-independence may seem rather
abstract, but it has real-world significance for the effectiveness of
law. To see how, imagine that the Constitution tells us to do
something other than what we think morality requires. Perhaps, for
example, it commands us to afford due process to a terrorism
suspect, even though we think national security creates a moral
imperative to imprison the suspect without trial. If our obligation to
obey the Constitution depends entirely on the moral status of its
content—of what it is telling us to do—then we will recognize no
obligation of obedience in this case, or in any case in which we
disagree with the Constitution’s requirements. We will simply do
what we think morally best in such cases, and the Constitution will
fail to function as law.
A Constitution that fails to motivate obedience in cases of
disagreement with its commands would be a disaster. This is
particularly true because constitutional law is less susceptible than
ordinary law to obedience through coercion. Legal subjects might
often obey sub-constitutional norms simply to avoid the
consequences of being caught disobeying them. (I need not
recognize the legitimate authority of the tax code in order to fear
criminal prosecution for tax avoidance.) In the constitutional
context, however, it very often is unrealistic to think that
disobedient subjects will be punished for their disobedience. The
contested nature of many constitutional norms frequently makes it
difficult to say with any confidence whether someone has obeyed
them or not. Enforcement mechanisms, moreover, are clumsy: in the
United States, constitutional disobedience by government officials
typically can be “punished” only by the blunt instrument of voting
them out at the next election or by the extreme and rare measure of
impeachment and removal from office. And the entity that is the
ultimate subject of the Constitution’s constraints—the democratic
majority itself—is immune even to these sanctions.
1270
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Effective constitutional law therefore depends largely on people’s
willingness to obey it in circumstances in which they disagree with
its commands but face no meaningful threat of sanctions for
disobedience. Indeed, we can think of a constitution as an attempt to
coordinate behavior in the face of disagreement. The people subject
to constitutional law will of course disagree on matters of substance:
on whether terrorism suspects deserve due process, whether
reproductive freedom deserves protection, whether Congress should
mandate the purchase of health insurance, and so on. The purpose of
constitutional law is to resolve, or at least to manage, these
substantive disagreements so that we can function with reasonable
coordination as a society. Constitutional law can succeed in this
function only if those subject to it will accept and obey its results—
even when they disagree with them in substance. Constitutional law,
then, must provide reasons to obey its results that are not dependent
on their substance. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “the point is as old as
Hobbes”:
We must set up a decision-procedure whose operation will settle,
not reignite, the controversies whose existence called for a
decision-procedure in the first place. This means that even though
the members of . . . society . . . disagree about [matters of
substance], they need to share a theory of legitimacy for the
decision-procedure that is to settle their disagreements. So, in
thinking about the reasons for setting up such a procedure, we
should think about reasons that can be subscribed to by people on
both sides of any one of these disagreements. 44

We can now begin to see why Barnett’s theory fails as an account
of the authority of the Constitution. Barnett grounds constitutional
authority—our obligation to obey the Constitution’s commands—in
the desirability of certain substantive results or values (his list of
libertarian “natural rights”). On the relatively abstract level of
morality, such a theory cannot support the obligation of obedience it
promises. One’s obligation, on Barnett’s theory, is to obey natural
rights, not the Constitution itself. One then should do as the
Constitution commands only insofar as this will foster the protection
of these natural rights. If obeying the Constitution fails to protect
natural rights, one has no obligation (on Barnett’s account) to obey it.
44. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1371
(2006) [hereinafter Waldron, Core] (citations omitted).
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On a more practical, sociological level, Barnett’s theory cannot
motivate obedience to constitutional law. If one agrees with
Barnett’s list of natural rights, then one has a reason to do as the
Constitution commands whenever doing so would promote those
rights. But if one disagrees with the rights on Barnett’s list, or with
the entire concept of natural rights; or if one agrees with Barnett’s
list of rights but disagrees, in any given case, that obeying the
Constitution would promote them; then one will perceive no
obligation to obey the Constitution. Barnett’s approach provides no
reason to obey that, in Waldron’s words, “can be subscribed to by
people on both sides” of a disagreement about natural rights. And
thus it fails to justify constitutional law as “a decision-procedure
whose operation will settle, not reignite, the controversies whose
existence called for a decision-procedure in the first place.” 45
Barnett’s theory therefore is, in essence, a deeply theorized,
entirely noncynical version of the Cynical Narrative. It defends
originalism, ultimately, on the ground that originalism promotes
certain libertarian values or outcomes, values that the proponent
endorses but that inevitably will be controversial among a broader
audience. If promoting Barnett’s libertarian values is the only reason
to obey an originalist Constitution, then someone who disagrees
with those preferred values has no reason for obedience. Such a
person will—must—either reject Barnett’s originalism or reject the
authority of the Constitution altogether.
Barnett thus offers us an example—rare in its honesty 46—of
what I will call a Values Imposition account of constitutional authority.
Such an account attempts to ground the authority of the
Constitution in its supposed capacity to promote particular

45. Id.
46. Rare, but not quite unique. Political philosopher Hadley Arkes, like Barnett,
interprets the Constitution as the embodiment of certain libertarian-leaning natural rights. See
HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE
SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994). Unlike Barnett, however,
Arkes does not directly address the question of the Constitution’s authority, and unlike Barnett,
Arkes is not an originalist: he advocates direct resort to natural-law principles in constitutional
adjudication. Other accounts that might be read to ground originalism in Values Imposition are
those of Richard Kay; see Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); and Lee Strang, see Strang, supra
note 29. Kay, at least, joins Barnett in adopting a relatively libertarian understanding of the
values the Constitution is designed to implement; Strang is less committal on this point,
identifying the Constitution with what he terms the “Aristotelian tradition” of pursuing “the
common good.” See Strang, supra note 29, at 437-41.
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substantive values or results. As I’ve argued, the attempt inevitably
fails because it is content-dependent, not content-independent.
Values Imposition accounts attribute authority, not to the
Constitution itself, but to the desired values or results. In so doing,
these accounts fail to motivate obedience by those who disagree with
the values or results in question.
III. INTERPRETATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY?
Barnett grounds his theory of interpretative methodology in a
theory of constitutional authority; his theory of authority fails, and
therefore his theory of methodology does too. This suggests that a
theory of interpretation needs a theory of authority, but it does not
prove it. Perhaps the centrality of authority to interpretation is an
unusual property of Barnett’s particular theory.
Much of the remainder of this Article is devoted to
demonstrating, directly or obliquely, that Barnett’s theory is
representative rather than unique in this regard; a good theory of
authority really is necessary for a good theory of interpretive
methodology. In Parts IV through VI, I make this case indirectly, by
examining accounts of constitutional authority and explaining how
they entail certain approaches to constitutional interpretation. In
this Part, however, I make the case directly. I begin with a relatively
practical argument that interpretive methodology must at least be
consistent with some account of constitutional authority. I then
address the possibility, suggested by Lawrence Solum, that an
approach to constitutional interpretation can be developed without
resort to theories of authority or other normative arguments.
First, however, I need to resolve a potential ambiguity in what I
mean by “constitutional interpretation.”

A. “Interpretation” vs. “Construction”
My use of the term “constitutional interpretation” might be
thought to beg a fairly important question. Many New Originalists,
including Barnett, distinguish between the acts of constitutional
“interpretation” and constitutional “construction.” 47 Larry Solum
defines constitutional interpretation as “the activity directed at

47. See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 118–30; Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010); Solum, Semantic
Originalism, supra note 8, at 67–87; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 195–212.
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discerning the semantic content of the constitutional text” and
constitutional construction as “the activity directed at resolving
vagueness, ambiguity, gaps, and contradictions [in the text] and at
constitutional implicature.” 48 So understood, constitutional
“interpretation” is limited to the project of determining what the
words of the constitutional text mean, and constitutional
“construction” is the additional project of determining how to apply
the text to a particular issue or dispute where the application is not
evident from the meaning of the words. As Solum puts it,
“[c]onstitutional construction begins when the meaning discovered
by constitutional interpretation runs out.” 49
Here is what I think is a straightforward example of the
interpretation-construction distinction. Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the
powers of the federal government that are expressly enumerated in
the document.50 “Interpretation” would be the project of
determining what concept or concepts the phrase “necessary and
proper” signifies. For example, does “necessary” include only those
means that are absolutely essential to the execution of some
enumerated power? Or, as John Marshall famously concluded in
McCulloch v. Maryland, does it have a more capacious meaning,
“import[ing] no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or
essential to another”? 51 Answering this sort of question is the
province of “interpretation” as that term is used by Solum and
others.
Suppose we “interpret” the word “necessary” (putting aside the
question of which technique we use to do this) in accordance with
Marshall’s broader definition. On the New Originalist
understanding, the additional project of “construction” remains. We
still have to “construe” the word “necessary,” so interpreted, to
determine how it applies to the particular case at hand—to
determine whether a particular measure taken by Congress (say, the
incorporation of a national bank) qualifies as “necessary” within that
word’s meaning. This additional task of “construction” is required

48.
49.
50.
51.
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because the word “necessary” by itself—even though we understand
its meaning—does not resolve the particular issue we must decide.
In this Article, I mean the term “constitutional interpretation” to
include both “interpretation” and “construction” in the New
Originalist senses. I will use the following definition of
“constitutional interpretation” going forward:
Constitutional interpretation is the process of determining whether and
how the Constitution applies to an issue or dispute.
A court trying to resolve the McCulloch issue of whether Congress
has the power to charter a Bank of the United States would have to
determine both what Solum calls the “semantic meaning” of the
Necessary
and
Proper
Clause
(the
New
Originalists’
“interpretation”), and whether chartering a bank is consistent with
that meaning (the New Originalists’ “construction”). I lump both
these tasks together under the label “interpretation.” I do so in part
because I believe this more-general sense of the concept
“interpretation” is consistent with how lawyers, and indeed the
general public, typically use the term; they do not usually draw the
interpretation/construction distinction, helpful though that
distinction may be in certain contexts. More fundamentally, I lump
these tasks together because I think an account of constitutional
authority is necessary to adequately theorize both of them, as I
contend in the next two sections.

B. The Practical Necessity of Authority
So, must an account of constitutional interpretation (defined
broadly as above) ultimately be grounded in some account of why
the Constitution is authoritative in the first place?
As a conceptual matter, I think the answer is no; but as a
practical matter, the answer is yes. One way in which the normative
grounding of an interpretive methodology might be disconnected
from the normative grounding of the law being interpreted is if that
law has no normative grounding—if it lacks legitimate authority
altogether. Imagine, for example, a theory of the least-offensive way
to interpret the illegitimate diktats of an all-powerful despot. Where
the law is illegitimate but also unchangeable and unavoidable, the
best we can do might be to come up with the least-harmful way to
interpret and apply that illegitimate law. We might then say that the
interpretive methodology is normatively legitimate even though the
law being interpreted is not.
1275
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But it seems unlikely that the interpretation of our Constitution
fits this model. This is not (merely) because the Constitution seems
more legitimate than the commands of a despot. It is due, rather, to
the fact that we could, if we (as a society) chose, replace the
Constitution through means that are peaceful and democratic, even
if they happen to be technically illegal (though they need not be).
The Framers, after all, substituted the Constitution for the Articles
of Confederation in this way. 52 Even if the Constitution is not
legitimate, its illegitimacy therefore is avoidable. And it would be
difficult to justify pursuing the least harmful method for interpreting
the Constitution if we thought the Constitution itself was
illegitimate and thus not worth interpreting. If we thought the
Constitution was illegitimate, the normatively justifiable thing to do
would be to replace it altogether, not to attempt triage by devising a
relatively inoffensive way to interpret it.
Thus it would make little sense to theorize about the legitimate
interpretation of an illegitimate Constitution. As a practical matter,
we must believe the Constitution itself is legitimately authoritative
before considering how best to interpret it. But is it possible that our
reasons for thinking the Constitution is legitimate can be entirely
independent of our reasons for preferring one or the other method of
interpreting it?
I very much doubt it. Suppose we believe, as Barnett does, that
the Constitution is legitimately authoritative because obeying it
tends to protect certain libertarian natural rights. It would then
make little sense to discern the meaning of the Constitution in a way
that is not designed to further this purpose. The likely result of
doing so would be to apply the Constitution in many situations in
which its authority is not justified.
52. The possibilities of replacing the Constitution through peaceful democratic means are
not limited to those delineated by Article V of the Constitution itself, which provides for
amendments according to certain procedures. We might, using non-Article V democratic
procedures, decide to discard the Constitution and (using non-Article V democratic procedures)
draft and ratify an entirely new one. This is precisely what the Framers did with respect to the
Articles of Confederation. Article XIII of the Articles required the approval of Congress and the
unanimous approval of each of the state legislatures for amendments. The procedure specified in
Article VII of the new Constitution proposed by the Convention of 1787, however, contemplated
ratification by special conventions (not the legislatures) in nine of the thirteen existing states
(not unanimously), and it did not require the approval of Congress. This is in fact the procedure
that was followed, albeit with the eventual endorsement of the Confederation Congress. See 1
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 121 (3d ed. 2011).
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For example, suppose we adopt Barnett’s natural-rights
grounding of constitutional authority; but suppose we then choose a
method of interpreting the Constitution that has a different
grounding altogether (say, that it is the best way to constrain
judges). It will only be happenstance that these diverse rationales—
protecting natural rights and constraining judges—converge to
produce the same result in any particular case. In some cases,
perhaps in many, the goal of constraining judges will conflict with
the goal of protecting natural rights. A constrained judge, for
instance, might fail to strike down a piece of legislation that impairs
a natural right the Constitution was designed to protect. It would
make much better sense to tailor our interpretive methodology to
our reason for having and obeying the Constitution in the first place.
Here is a somewhat more theoretical way to make the relevant
point, with a debt to the work of Ronald Dworkin. Constitutional
law is a conscious human practice with moral implications. We as a
society have (and to some extent each of us as individuals has) a
choice whether to engage in it or not, and our choice to engage in it
implies a determination that the practice is morally worthwhile on
the whole. In determining how the practice operates—how best to
interpret the Constitution’s commands, for instance—we ought to
consider the practice in its morally best light and perform it in a way
that is consistent with this moral vision. 53 Constitutional law
purports to bind us in important ways, and if it is a morally
justifiable practice, that binding authority has a justifiable moral
grounding. The way we perform a core aspect of the practice—
interpreting the Constitution, that is, determining how it binds us in
particular instances—therefore should reflect, indeed promote, that
moral grounding. Constitutional interpretation should further
constitutional authority.
This is not to say that every feature of a practice like
constitutional law must be justifiable by reference to the moral
grounding of the practice as a whole. Some features of a practice
might serve to effect side constraints rather than to promote the
underlying purpose of the practice. Consider the rule in ice hockey
requiring players to wear helmets. Wearing helmets probably cannot
be justified by reference to the overall purposes of the practice of ice

53. This is essentially Dworkin’s understanding of the project of “interpretation” writ
large. See his lengthy discussion in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986).
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hockey (athletic competition, entertainment, physical exercise).
Some even think wearing helmets impedes some of these goals. The
helmet rule, rather, is justified by the side constraint of preventing
serious injury while playing hockey.
There may be aspects of the American practice of constitutional
law that resemble the helmet rule in ice hockey in this respect,
though I am at a loss to identify one. In any event, interpretive
methodology almost certainly does not qualify. How we interpret the
Constitution is far too central to our practice of constitutional law
itself to be justifiable solely or primarily by reference to a side
constraint. Constitutional interpretation is our means of determining
how constitutional law binds us, and binding us is simply what
constitutional law does. It seems impossible to understand how the
Constitution binds without also understanding why it does so.
It would then be difficult to justify an interpretive approach
designed to identify the meaning of an unjustifiable Constitution, or
to identify its meaning without reference to the reason the
Constitution is justifiable. To put the matter concisely: a persuasive
answer to the question of interpretive methodology should follow
from a persuasive answer to the question of constitutional authority.

C. Interpretation Without Tears? Solum’s “Semantic” Approach to
Interpretation
In his provocative essay “Semantic Originalism,” New Originalist
theorist Lawrence Solum suggests that significant portions of a
theory of constitutional interpretation can be assembled without
resort to accounts of authority or other deeply normative arguments.
Solum describes and defends a core conception of originalism that
consists of four basic assertions, or theses. The “Fixation Thesis”
holds that “the meaning of constitutional provisions is fixed at the
time of ratification.” 54 The “Clause Meaning Thesis” holds (with a
number of clarifications and qualifications) that the meaning of
constitutional provisions is determined by their original public
meaning. 55 The “Contribution Thesis” holds that the meaning of the
Constitution (so defined) contributes to—that is, becomes part of—
the content of the law.56 The “Fidelity Thesis” holds that we are
54. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 3; see id. at 2–4, 59–67.
55. See id. at 5, 38–58.
56. See id. at 6–8, 134–49. Solum subsequently has reformulated the Contribution Thesis
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obligated to obey the Constitution (absent some overriding moral
reason to the contrary) because it is part of the supreme law of the
land. 57 Together these theses add up to roughly the following
statement of originalism: we are obligated to obey the original public
meaning of the Constitution.
What is most interesting in Solum’s arguments for present
purposes is his belief that most of (his definition of) originalism—
the Fixation Thesis, the Clause Meaning Thesis, and the
Contribution Thesis—can be defended purely as a descriptive matter,
that is, purely as statements of fact about our linguistic and legal
cultures, without the need to rely upon normative arguments. 58
Solum believes that the meaning of the Constitution just is its
original public meaning at the time of ratification and that this
meaning just is part of our law. He acknowledges that he may be
wrong about how to identify constitutional meaning and whether it
is part of our law, but he insists that whether he is wrong is a
question purely of fact, not of normative evaluation. The questions
of what the Constitution means, he contends, and of whether and
how it contributes to our law, are in essence empirical questions,
like the questions of when the Constitution was ratified or of the
chemical composition of the parchment it was printed on. 59

as the “constraint principle”: “the idea that the communicative content of the constitution . . .
should constrain the legal content of constitutional doctrine and thereby should also constrain
the way officials behave.” Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 155 (2012) [hereinafter Solum, Faith and Fidelity].
I don’t believe this reformulation is material to my treatment of Solum’s approach in this
Article.
57. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 8–9, 149–60.
58. Solum acknowledges that the Fidelity Thesis, holding that the Constitution must be
obeyed, relies on normative arguments. See id. at 8 (“[T]he [Fidelity] [T]hesis is based on moral
premises: it is a claim about political obligation and civic virtue.”); see generally id. at 8–9, 149–
60.
59. See id. at 8:
The first three theses [Fixation, Clause Meaning, and Contribution] share an
important characteristic: they all make factual claims that do not rely on moral
premises. The fixation thesis and the clause meaning thesis make claims about the
semantic content of the Constitution: as a matter of fact, the meaning of a given
constitutional provision is fixed at the time of origin by its original public meaning.
The contribution thesis makes a claim about the legal significance of the constitutions
[sic] semantic content: as a matter of fact, the semantic content makes some
contribution to American law. These factual claims are not based on arguments of
political morality. The semantic content of the Constitution of 1789 was fixed at that
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I am deeply skeptical of these assertions (which is not the same
as saying I can refute them decisively). The extent to which we care
about the semantic meaning (or “communicative content” 60) of the
constitutional text, I believe, depends on whether, and why, we
think constitutional law is justified in the first place, and these
questions inevitably will be matters of normative argument
For example, I might believe that constitutional law is justified
because (and to the extent that) it provides relatively transparent
and determinate rules that can help us avoid costly political disputes
over important issues—a “rule of law” rationale that flows from
what I call in Part VI a Dispute Resolution account of constitutional
authority. 61 If this is my belief about the justification of
constitutional authority, then it follows that I will want interpreters
to look for (and be bound by) the semantic meaning of the text only
insofar as it furthers this justification—that is, only insofar as it
helps provide relatively transparent and determinate rules. If the
search for semantic meaning does not regularly generate these kinds
of rules (as in fact seems rather likely, given the historiographic and
conceptual challenges of identifying original public meaning), I
might then want interpreters to look elsewhere for the content of
constitutional law—perhaps to (more-accessible) modern-day
meanings, or perhaps to relatively specific court decisions of
constitutional issues.
On the other hand, I might believe that constitutional law is
justified because the process that created the constitutional text—
the Framing—is especially reliable as a way of generating good moral
rules or principles. (This would be a version of the Moral Guidance
account of authority I discuss in Part V.) 62 If so, then I will want

time because of the way that communication through language works, and not
because it is a good idea to interpret the Constitution that way.
Id. at 8. The bulk of Solum’s argument that the Fixation and Clause Meaning Theses are
implications of purely descriptive semantic theory can be found in id. at 27–126. The bulk of his
argument that the Contribution Thesis is an implication of purely descriptive legal positivism
can be found in id. at 139–43.
60. In Semantic Originalism, Solum uses the terms “semantic meaning” and “linguistic
meaning” to describe the content of the Constitution that he believes is fixed at the time of
ratification and contributes to the law in some meaningful way. See id., passim. In later work,
Solum often uses the term “communicative content” in place of these terms. See, e.g., Solum,
Faith and Fidelity, supra note 56, at 154–55.
61. See infra Part VI.H.
62. See infra Part V.A–B.
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interpreters to look for (and be bound by) the rules or principles that
were in fact generated by the Framing process, which would seem to
entail a search for the semantic meaning of the text, even if that
meaning typically is not particularly transparent or determinate.
Whether and how much we care about the semantic meaning of
the constitutional text, then, will depend on our normative purposes
for practicing constitutional law (for interpreting it, implementing it,
enforcing it, obeying it, and so on); it will depend on our
(normatively driven) theory of constitutional authority. If this is
right, then it refutes Solum’s assertion that the Contribution Thesis
is purely a matter of descriptive truth and not at all susceptible to
normative argument. And while I am less confident that Solum’s
Fixation and Clause Meaning Theses rely similarly on normative
premises, note that those theses become less relevant to the extent
one rejects or waters down the Contribution Thesis. If the semantic
meaning of the constitutional text contributes little or nothing to the
content of constitutional law, then when and how that meaning is
fixed becomes a matter of mostly academic concern.
Solum’s arguments deserve a more robust evaluation than this,
but that task will have to await another forum. For the purposes of
the present Article, whether Solum is right or wrong about the nonnormativity of “Semantic Originalism” is mostly beside the point.
This is because Solum’s conclusion applies only to the process he
calls “interpretation”—the process of identifying the meaning of the
text—and not at all to the process of “construction,” of applying the
text to resolve an issue where, as in most cases, the meaning of the
text does not resolve that issue by itself.

1. Normative judgments in construction
Suppose Solum is correct that the meaning of the Constitution
just is its public meaning at the time of ratification, and that this
meaning just is part of our law. (This sums up the implications of his
Fixation, Clause Meaning, and Contribution Theses.) Much work
remains to be done to determine how the Constitution applies to
particular issues and disputes, even with its meaning and its status
as law determined. There is, first of all, the process that Solum and
other New Originalists call “construction,” which, as I noted in Part
III.A, is what happens “when the meaning discovered by
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constitutional interpretation runs out.” 63 Constitutional text is
endemically vague; many of its provisions “admit of borderline (or
uncertain) applications,” in Solum’s phrase. 64 A few of many
examples are the terms “legislative Powers,” “executive Power,” and
“judicial Power” in Articles I, II, and III, respectively;65 the grant of
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States” in Article I, section 8; 66 and the guarantees of “the
freedom of speech” in the First Amendment, 67 “due process of law”
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 and “the equal
protection of the laws” in the Fourteenth Amendment. 69
Constitutional text also sometimes is ambiguous, as with the word
“necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 70 Solum identifies
the additional possibilities that the text will have gaps or
contradictions and that it will have implied content. 71
In short, the meaning of the constitutional text is frequently,
indeed systemically, underdeterminate. In order to apply that
underdeterminate text to the resolution of a particular issue, an
interpreter (what I suppose Solum would call a “construer”) will
have to make normative choices. She will have to decide on a general
approach to construction—construe the Constitution in the way that
promotes justice? Construe it the way the Framers would have
done?—which decision inevitably will reflect normative judgments. 72
And, depending on which approach she chooses—”construe so as to
promote justice,” for example—she may have to make additional
normative judgments in applying that approach.
My conclusion in this Article—that a theory of constitutional
interpretation, broadly understood, 73 must rest on a normative
account of constitutional authority—would hold true for this
63. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 69.
64. Id. at 70.
65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. III, § 1.
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1.
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
71. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 73–75.
72. Solum describes the various approaches to construction offered by contemporary
originalists in id. at 76–79.
73. Broadly understood to include what Solum and other New Originalists call
“construction.” See supra Part III.A.
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important and usually necessary process of construction, even if it
does not hold true for the process of identifying the meaning of the
constitutional text.

2. Other necessary normative judgments
My conclusion also would apply to other aspects of
interpretation writ large. (Remember that I am defining
“interpretation” fairly capaciously: as the process of determining whether
and how the Constitution applies to an issue or dispute. 74) Consider Solum’s
Contribution Thesis, which holds that the Constitution’s original
meaning contributes in some way to the content of our law but
which does not specify how it contributes. 75 An interpreter often
(perhaps usually) will have to answer this “how” question in order
to apply the Constitution in a particular case.
Suppose, for example, that an originalist judge in 1954
determines that the original meaning of the phrase “deny[ing] . . .
the equal protection of the laws” 76 in the Fourteenth Amendment is
vague with respect to the question of enforced racial segregation in
public schools—that is, that school segregation is neither clearly
consistent nor clearly inconsistent with the original meaning of the
Clause. The judge then must decide the implications of this
indeterminacy—whether it ends the matter or simply opens the door
to the further process of construction.
It would not be ridiculous for the judge to elect the former
alternative—to conclude that, because the Constitution’s text does
not determine the issue, there simply is no constitutional rule
governing school segregation (and thus segregation is left to be
governed by sub-constitutional laws). Such a conclusion would be
consistent with Solum’s Contribution Thesis: the judge would be
acknowledging that the Constitution’s meaning contributes to the
content of the law. But he would be making the further judgment
that this contribution is limited to cases in which the Constitution’s
meaning is determinate. And that judgment may be, perhaps
inevitably will be, a normative one. For example, the judge may
justify his position as an implication of what I will call in Part V a

74. See id.
75. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 6 (“The contribution thesis itself
does not answer questions about the strength or structure of that contribution.”).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority: he might believe
that constitutional commands should be obeyed because, and only to
the extent that, they represent a trustworthy moral judgment of the
Framers or of the people who ratified the document. The absence of
a determinate textual resolution of the segregation issue might
signal, for the judge, the absence of a relevant judgment of the
Framers or the ratifiers that must be obeyed—and thus the absence
of binding constitutional law.
Or suppose the judge identifies a determinate original meaning
but is faced with precedent that, if followed, would mandate a result
inconsistent with that meaning. Even assuming the judge accepts the
Contribution Thesis, he will have to decide whether the
Constitution’s original meaning trumps the precedent or vice-versa.
He will have to decide, that is, how to prioritize different sources of
law (original meaning and precedent) when they conflict. And this
decision too invites moral judgments.
So there is plenty of room for normative arguments and
judgments in constitutional interpretation, even if Solum is right
that a significant part of interpretation is non-normative. Solum puts
it this way: “[T]he meaning of the written [C]onstitution”—the part
Solum thinks can be identified non-normatively—“is important
enough to make for a substantial mouthful even if it isn’t the whole
enchilada.” 77 I would add that it usually takes quite a few more bites
to finish the enchilada.
IV. AUTHORITY BY CONSENT
If I am right that a theory of constitutional interpretation
requires a theory of constitutional authority, the next questions
become: What are the plausible theories of authority? And what
interpretive methods do they support?
I have been able to identify three potentially plausible ways to
justify constitutional authority, each of which has been relied upon
in some form to support originalist interpretation. This Part
introduces, and critiques, the first such account, one based on
consent. The problem with what I will call a Consent account, simply
put, is that meaningful consent to be governed by the Constitution is
not, and probably could not be, a widespread fact in modern society.

77. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 28 n.109.
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Most of us have not consented to constitutional law in a way that
can justify its authority over us.

A. The Normative Force of Consent
Recall that a Values Imposition account of constitutional
authority, like Randy Barnett’s, fails because it cannot provide a
content-independent reason to obey the Constitution. 78 Those who
agree with the preferred set of values do not need the Constitution
to tell them how to act. Those who disagree with those values have
no reason to obey the Constitution as a way to implement them.
Consent, however, might provide a content-independent reason
for obedience. Our consent is an exercise of our autonomy; by
consenting to something, we are asserting our capacity to plan our
own lives. As the legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz writes:
There is some normative force to the fact that one gives one’s free
and informed consent to an arrangement affecting oneself . . . .
Consent, whether wise or foolish, expresses the will of the agent
concerning the conduct of his own life. Whatever mess results from
his consent is, in part at least, of his own making. Since his life is
his own, it is relevant whether it is under his control or not, and
consent shows that it is. 79

In order for consent to be effective as a means of planning or
“controlling” one’s own life, that consent must cause some actual
change in the conditions of that life. My consent to something must
actually obligate me somehow, or at least create a strong moral
reason for me to act consistently with my consent; otherwise my
consent would be ineffectual as an expression of my autonomy. And
note that the power of consent to impose moral obligations (or
create moral reasons) can apply even when what we are consenting
to is in essence a loss of control, in the form of the subjugation of our
own judgment or wishes to those of others. If I agree to allow my
spouse to choose the paint color in our kitchen, for example, I am
consenting to be bound by her decision, even if I disagree with it in
substance. Indeed, by consenting to marry my spouse, I have agreed
to stay with her through richer or poorer, in sickness and in health,

78. See supra Part II.D.
79. Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 162–63 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
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etc., even if I later decide I would prefer not to. By purchasing a
home subject to a covenant that allows a homeowner’s association to
make rules governing various issues, from the color of our siding to
the content of our garden to the amount of the maintenance fees we
must pay, my spouse and I have consented to be bound by those
rules, even if we think them burdensome or unwise. And so on.
As these examples suggest, the reason, perhaps the obligation,
created by the act of giving consent is a content-independent one: it
does not depend on the pre-existing moral status of what one has
consented to, or on one’s own views about that moral status. If I
have consented to be governed by the decisions of a homeowner’s
association, I then have a reason, perhaps an obligation, to abide by
those decisions, even if (a) I think those decisions are incorrect as a
moral matter and (b) those decisions are in fact incorrect as a moral
matter. My consent has in effect altered my moral universe, such
that actions I would not have been required to take—perhaps even
actions I would have been morally forbidden to take—prior to my
consent are now, thanks to that consent, actions that I must take (or
at least have a strong reason to take).

B. Consent as Popular Sovereignty
If an individual can create a self-imposed moral obligation by
giving her consent, then perhaps a collection of individuals—a
“people”—can create a collectively self-imposed moral obligation by
consenting to be governed by a certain person or entity or process.
Suppose we start with the premise that “the people” are sovereign—
entitled to rule themselves—in a sense analogous to how the
individual is autonomous (entitled to rule herself). “The people”
then would be capable of exercising their sovereignty by consenting
to be governed in a certain way—even if that form of government
alienates some of that “people’s” existing capacity to decide things
for themselves. Consent to be ruled would be an exercise of popular
sovereignty, even if what is being consented to is not a completely
“popular” form of government.
This basic idea of popular sovereignty as consent to government
goes back, of course, at least to Hobbes, 80 and runs forward through

80. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227–28 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (describing the
formation of a commonwealth as an act of unanimous consent). Keith Whittington traces the
notion even farther back, to the writings of the French philosopher Jean Bodin. See
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Locke 81 and Rousseau 82 to the American Founders. The Declaration
of Independence declared that “Governments . . . deriv[e] their
just powers from the consent of the governed,” and Alexander
Hamilton leveraged the notion of consent into a theory of
constitutional authority:
[T]he power of the people is superior to both [the judicial and the
legislative power], and . . . where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
the latter rather than the former. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]hough I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution
will never concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental
principle of republican government which admits the right of the
people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever
they find it inconsistent with their happiness . . . . Until the
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or
changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves
collectively, as well as individually . . . . 83

Note that Hamilton holds the Constitution superior, not just to
the legislature (which he earlier calls the “agents” of the people 84),
but also to “the people” themselves. Having engaged in the “solemn
and authoritative act” of consenting to the Constitution, the people
cannot later “alter or abolish” that Constitution simply because they
“find it inconsistent with their happiness.” They can do so only by
means of another “solemn and authoritative act.”
Hamilton’s account thus can be read as a Consent account of
constitutional authority: it justifies the binding nature of the

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 113–16 (citing generally JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley ed. & trans., 1955)).
81. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305, 367–68
(Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (describing the creation of “civil society” as an act of unanimous
consent).
82. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 16–27 (Willmoore Kendall trans.,
1954) (describing the formation of a unanimous “original agreement” to transfer the private
rights of individuals to a sovereign).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439–40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78].
84. Id. at 439. Hamilton’s logic on this point was cribbed by John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803).
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Constitution as a function of “the people’s” sovereign act of
consenting to its rule. The people gave their consent to the
Constitution; the people now have a moral obligation to obey the
Constitution, whether they agree with its commands (whether they
“find it [c]onsistent with their happiness”) or not.
We might recognize the threads of Hamilton’s nascent account
in contemporary theorist Bruce Ackerman’s influential narrative of
“dualist democracy.” 85 Ackerman distinguishes between “normal
politics”—everyday,
typically
self-interested
decision-making
through the mechanisms of representative democracy—and “higher
lawmaking”—the creation of “supreme law in the name of the
People.” 86 Ackerman’s “higher lawmaking” is supreme because it
occurs on behalf of “the People,” not just those who govern the
People or some subset of the People. The constitutional law that
emerges from higher lawmaking therefore, in Ackerman’s view, is
binding on normal politics going forward (and must be enforced, and
periodically “synthesized” with earlier acts of higher lawmaking, by
the Supreme Court). 87

C. Consent and Originalism
Originalists sometimes ground their methodology in the
normative force of consent, and it is not hard to see the connection.
Suppose Hamilton and Ackerman are right that the Constitution was
an act of popular sovereignty—of consent by “the people” (or “the
People,” with Ackerman’s capital “P”)—and that it therefore is
supreme over the products of “normal politics.” Suppose, in other
words, that the Constitution is “the instrument by which the
consent of the governed—the fundamental requirement of any
legitimate government—is transformed into a government . . . .” 88
How do we know what it was that the People consented to?
85. The canonical statement of Ackerman’s theory appears in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
86. Id. at 6. Ackerman describes the basic distinction in id. at 6–7. He elucidates each
concept at much greater length in id. at 230-65 (“normal politics”) and id. at 266–94 (“higher
lawmaking”).
87. On the “preservationist” function of the Court, see id. at 9–10, 60–61, 72; on its
function of “synthesis,” see id. at 86–99, 113–30, 140–62.
88. These words belong to Edwin Meese, Ronald Reagan’s second Attorney General and
an influential catalyst of the burgeoning originalist movement in the 1980s. Edwin Meese III,
The Law of the Constitution (Speech at Tulane University) (Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in
ORIGINALISM, supra note 10, at 99, 102.
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The obvious answer is to determine what the actual people
(small “p”) who did the actual consenting—those who participated
in ratifying the Constitution and its subsequent amendments—
would have understood the text of the Constitution to mean.
Consent theory thus appears to imply originalist interpretation, most
likely in its “original public meaning” variant. As originalist theorist
Keith Whittington writes, “originalism . . . enforces the
authoritative decision of the people acting as sovereign.” 89
I should note that the popular sovereignty/originalism
connection is not as inevitable as this quick statement of originalist
logic suggests. 90 If an individual can consent to surrender her
judgment to another, then a “People” might consent to surrender its
judgment to another—perhaps to a subsequent iteration of “the
People,” perhaps even to constitutional judges. This raises the
possibility that what the People consented to when they authorized
the Constitution was in fact a nonoriginalist Constitution—a
Constitution that could be interpreted by subsequent decisionmakers in a way that goes beyond, perhaps even is inconsistent with,
the original People’s understanding of its meaning. 91 In short, the
original understanding might have contemplated nonoriginalist
interpretation. If so, then subsequent interpreters would be violating
the principle of popular sovereignty rather than upholding it by
pursuing originalist methods. 92
I won’t linger on this objection, however, because I want to focus
on two more-foundational problems with the Consent account. First,
the notion that “the People” during the crucial Framing periods
actually gave meaningful consent to the Constitution is problematic.
Second, whether or not “the People” in 1788 or 1791 or 1868
consented to the Constitution is, in an important sense, irrelevant,
because those “People” are not us.

89. WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 111. To the same effect, see Lash, supra note 29.
90. Whittington, for his part, is well aware of the nuances of and potential objections to
any attempt to ground originalism in popular sovereignty. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at
111–13 (acknowledging that the connection has been “underdeveloped” in originalist thought
and posing several important questions to be resolved); id. at 113–59 (addressing these
questions).
91. This is, I think, a fair summary of Ackerman’s actual position on constitutional
interpretation. In any event, Ackerman clearly is not an originalist. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra
note 85, at 131–62 (describing the Court’s interpretive function on a dualist theory).
92. This is the possibility argued for (with a focus on original intent rather than original
public meaning) in Powell, supra note 22.
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D. The Nonunanimous Framing(s)
We can start with the observation that the first three words of
the Constitution, “We the People,” are a fiction. 93 Even in 1789,
when the original Constitution took effect by its own terms, the
electorate eligible to participate in the ratification process was only a
subset of “the People” as a whole, that is, of the population that
would be bound by the document. Slaves of course could not vote; 94
neither could women in any state, 95 or those without property in
many states,96 or free blacks in some. 97 And even among those who
could participate in the ratification process, approval of the new
Constitution was far from unanimous. 98 A substantial percentage of
the American people at the time of the Framing therefore cannot be
said to have consented to the Constitution in any affirmative sense.
The same problems afflict each of the Constitution’s
amendments, though to a lesser extent as we move forward in time.
Racial restrictions on the franchise actually increased between the
Founding and the Civil War, 99 such that in 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, free blacks could vote in only
eight of the thirty-three states. 100 Most property requirements had
disappeared by then, 101 but women still could not vote in any
93. I owe this admittedly provocative but quite accurate phrasing to Randy Barnett. See
BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 14.
94. “[N]o [state or federal] regime either before or after the Revolution ever gave the
vote to slaves . . . .” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005).
95. See id. The minor exception was New Jersey, which “apparently did allow a few
propertied widows to vote.” Id.
96. Eleven of the thirteen states required ownership of property in order to vote at the
time they ratified the Constitution. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 327–28 (2000) (Table A.1). Akhil
Amar notes, however, that eight of these states suspended or liberalized their property
requirements for purposes of electing delegates to their ratifying conventions. See AMAR, supra
note 94, at 7.
97. Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia barred free blacks from voting at the time of
ratification. See KEYSSAR, supra note 96, at 327–28 (Table A.1).
98. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 121–28 (describing the contentious
ratification process).
99. See KEYSSAR, supra note 96, at 53–60.
100. They were Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
Vermont, and Rhode Island. See id. at 87–88, 89. In New York, moreover, only propertied free
blacks could vote. See id. at 87–88.
101. See id. at 351–55 (Table A.9) (showing only three states—New York, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina—with property requirements as of 1855, one of which (New York) applied
its requirement only to free blacks, the other of which (Rhode Island) applied it only to non-
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state.102 The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, moreover,
were in essence forced upon the recently rebellious southern states:
the former through ratification by provisional Reconstruction
legislatures, 103 and the latter by the coercive device of making
ratification a condition of readmission to the Union. 104 Many
citizens, too, opposed ratification, as many had several generations
earlier at the original Framing. With the enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment (prohibiting denial of the vote based on race), and then
the Nineteenth (sex), the Twenty-Fourth (failure to pay a poll tax),
and the Twenty-Sixth (age if at least eighteen), the most egregious
exclusions have been eliminated over time. Certainly, however, no
amendment has ever been ratified with the unanimous consent of
the citizenry alive at that moment.
Can “the People” consent to a constitution in a way that binds
dissenters? If consent is the mechanism doing the binding, it is hard
to see how. A citizen who dissents from the Constitution has not
somehow exercised her own autonomy by virtue of the fact that
some other citizens (even a large majority of other citizens) voted for
it. The result has been imposed upon her, not invited by her.
Perhaps we can claim that “the People” as a collective body has
consented to something by virtue of a majority or super-majority of
its components having consented to it. But this maneuver seems
more rhetorical than real. The Constitution, after all, purports to
bind citizens (and others) not just collectively, but in their individual
capacities as well. It is true that our Constitution, with the exception
of the Thirteenth Amendment, directly limits only actions taken by
government, not those performed by private actors. But I cannot
insist that the government take some action that I favor on the
ground that I oppose the constitutional provision that forbids it. My
ability as a citizen to use my vote and my power of political speech to
create a legal regime I favor is limited by constitutional constraints
on the content of that legal regime. I cannot somehow exempt
myself from the Constitution merely because I failed to consent to it.
So it appears that consent cannot explain the authority of the
Constitution, even with respect to all of those alive during the

native citizens).
102. See id. at 172–83.
103. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 476.
104. See id. at 502–04.
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relevant framing periods. And this difficulty is likely to be endemic
to any modern constitution, not just our own. Not every constitution
suffers from the grievous exclusion of slaves and women at its
framing. But any constitution framed to govern a large polity in the
diverse conditions of a modern democracy will have its dissenters. By
itself, the notion of consent cannot justify binding such people.

E. The Dead-Hand Problem
The nonunanimity problem with Consent accounts is
compounded by what is sometimes called the “dead hand” problem:
the chronological distance between our own time and the crucial
Framing periods. No American alive today was alive when the
original Constitution was ratified in 1788, or when the Bill of Rights
was added in 1791, or when the Reconstruction Amendments were
added between 1865 and 1870; so none of us could have given our
consent to those actions when they occurred. Even a (counterfactual)
act of unanimous consent to the Constitution by the relevant
Framing generation therefore cannot bind us on the theory that we
have consented. “We the People” is really “they the People”; the
Constitution was their act of popular sovereignty, not ours.
Just to be clear, note that the objection here is not to the
Hamiltonian idea that “the People” might choose to bind themselves
going forward. Prospective self-binding, after all, is what consent is
all about. The objection is to the notion that “the People” who did
the consenting in 1788 (or 1791 or 1868) is the same “People” that
the Constitution purports to bind today. What is problematic about
the Hamiltonian account is not the notion of self-binding that it
endorses, but rather the tenuous conception of the “self” that it
assumes.
Note too that we cannot dodge this difficulty by pointing to the
possibility of amending the Constitution using the procedures
specified in Article V. That possibility can’t overcome our lack of
consent any more than using those procedures, or failing to use
them, can demonstrate our consent. We have not, after all,
consented to Article V as the exclusive means to amend the
Constitution, or to the principle that amending it (rather than
simply ignoring it) is our only option if, in Hamilton’s phrase, we
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now “find it inconsistent with [our] happiness.” 105 To derive
consent from Article V is to engage in bootstrapping. 106
Nor is the problem solved by the fact that some living Americans
have expressly consented to be bound by the Constitution.
Naturalized citizens do so when they take their citizenship oaths,
and government officials are required by Article VI to swear or affirm
that they will “support this Constitution.” 107 But this is a very small
percentage of the citizenry. The vast majority of the people have not
given express consent to the Constitution’s authority.
There are a few more-sophisticated attempts to resolve the deadhand problem, but none of them turns out to be very satisfying.
There is the notion that we have given our tacit consent to the
Constitution by living within the polity it supposedly governs. There
is the device of constructive or hypothetical consent, which holds that
we would or should have consented and therefore can be deemed to
have done so. And there is the idea of what Keith Whittington calls
“potential sovereignty”—the argument that we must recognize the
Constitution as binding so that we in turn may use constitutional
law to bind others. I address each in turn.

F. Tacit “Consent”
Some theorists have argued that the act of continuing to live
within a regime amounts to a person’s tacit consent to be bound by
that regime. Rousseau, for example, attributed consent to be bound
by law to the act of “resid[ing] within the state after its . . .
establishment.” 108 Locke similarly found consent in the “Possession,
or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of . . .
government.” 109

105. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 139–40.
106. On this point, see Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2009).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. On its most natural reading, the oath required by Article
VI compels officials only to support the Constitution while carrying out their official duties, not
to obey it in other capacities. And keep in mind that if an official has no duty to obey the
Constitution generally, she has no duty to obey Article VI’s oath requirement in particular. It is
at least debatable whether an official who has taken the required oath, believing that she is
under no obligation to obey the Constitution, would be subject to such an obligation by virtue of
having taken the oath.
108. ROUSSEAU, supra note 82, at 168.
109. LOCKE, supra note 81, at 392.
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But these theories are unconvincing because they suppose a
choice that, for most people, does not exist. Most of us cannot
simply pack up and leave our homes, our families, and our jobs to
emigrate elsewhere; the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, or at
least considerably higher than the costs of living under a
Constitution to which we would not consent if given a meaningful
choice. And where would we go if we could leave? Except perhaps
for billionaires who can purchase remote private islands, most of us
could move only to other extant societies with their own existing
systems of government, which may or may not be preferable on the
whole to the one we are considering leaving. Valid consent requires
the option to withhold consent, to say “no”;110 but for very few (if
any) of us is this a realistic alternative. Tacit consent is not real
consent. 111

G. Constructive “Consent”
Tacit consent is an attempt to deploy the mechanics of consent
where actual consent is lacking. A similar maneuver is the idea of
constructive (or hypothetical) consent, which holds that we should be
treated as having consented to something if, presented with certain
ideally fair decision-making conditions, we would have consented to
it. The paradigmatic constructive-consent theory is John Rawls’s
device of a hypothetical “original position” from which equally
situated individuals would choose the central features of an ideal
political system. 112 Can we say the Constitution is binding because
we would have consented to it if given the opportunity to do so in
something like Rawls’s original position?
The answer is either “no” or “kind of.” If the suggestion is that
constructive consent can substitute for actual consent, the answer is
no. Actual consent has normative force because it is an exercise of a
person’s autonomy, her capacity to make her own decisions,

110. See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 16 (“[F]or consent to have any
meaning, it must be possible to say, ‘I do not consent’ instead of ‘I consent.’”). Barnett presents
an extensive, and mostly persuasive, argument against the notion that the Constitution binds us
because we have consented to it. See id. at 11–31.
111. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 130–31 (arguing against the validity of tacit
consent).
112. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–22 (1971). A similar idea is presented in
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY 107, 447–50 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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whatever those decisions may be. As Raz aptly puts it, “[c]onsent,
whether wise or foolish, expresses the will of the agent concerning
the conduct of his own life. Whatever mess results from his consent
is, in part at least, of his own making.” 113 The normativity of actual
consent flows from the very possibility of using it unwisely. We
would hardly be autonomous if we were always required to make
good decisions.
Constructive consent is entirely different. The point of the
constructive-consent device is not to allow the individual to accept
moral obligations in a way that furthers her autonomy, but rather to
identify the kinds of decisions the individual would make if certain
obstacles to rational decision-making were removed. Its point, in
other words, is to identify good decisions. Perhaps we can say that a
person is bound in some way by the decisions she would have made
under conditions of hypothetical consent, by virtue of the fact that
they are (or rather would be) good decisions. But we cannot say she
is bound because she actually consented to those decisions. She did
not actually consent to them. Actual consent, again, supposes the
possibility of bad decisions—of consent given foolishly. 114
So constructive consent cannot bring whatever obligations come
from actual consent. This is not to say that the device of constructive
consent cannot contribute in some way to the recognition of
authority or of some other kind of obligation. By helping us identify
good answers to certain kinds of questions, constructive consent
might lead us to a satisfactory account of constitutional authority.
Constructive consent asks us, in essence, to imagine the political
system to which we would consent if freed from the real-world
baggage of unequal bargaining power and knowledge of how our
decisions will affect our own selfish interests. It is possible that we
would determine that such a system includes an authoritative
constitution, perhaps even one much like our own. (In this sense,
constructive consent might “kind of” make the Constitution
binding.) But constructive consent in this vein is merely a heuristic
technique, a way of revealing some worthwhile account of authority

113. Raz, supra note 79, at 162–63.
114. On the failure of constructive or hypothetical consent to create obligations, see Raz,
supra note 79, at 162–63 (“[E]ven if real consent is a source of authority, it is far from clear that
hypothetical consent is. I know of no argument which shows that it is.”); see also PETERS, supra
note 42, at 52–57 (presenting an expanded version of the argument against authority by
constructive consent).

1295

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

that, because it is worthwhile, can stand on its own merits. The
authority of the Constitution would exist by virtue of this standalone account identified using constructive consent, not by virtue of
constructive consent itself. 115

H. “Potential Sovereignty”
Keith Whittington, a New Originalist theorist, makes the
intriguing suggestion that the Constitution has authority, not
because it reflects any actual exercise of popular sovereignty, but
because it makes possible our potential exercise of popular
sovereignty.116 The Constitution, Whittington writes,
is not binding in a strong sense. We have not vested it with
authority. Rather, it is binding in a weaker, but still sufficient
sense, in that it represents our potential to govern ourselves. By
accepting the authority of the Constitution, we accept our own
authority to remake it. The existing Constitution is a placeholder
for our own future expression of popular sovereignty. 117

If I understand Whittington, he is claiming that we ought to
obey the Constitution, not because we are bound by anything the
long-dead “People” of the late-eighteenth or mid-nineteenth
centuries did, but rather because obeying it now gives us standing to
impose constitutional law on future generations later. To put this
claim negatively, we cannot purport to assert sovereignty over future
generations if we refuse to recognize the sovereignty of the Framing
generation over us. So we ought to do the latter to preserve our
ability to do the former.
This argument is interestingly original, but it is not convincing.
There is no reason to think that our recognizing the (otherwise
nonexistent) authority of a prior generation over us somehow gives
us a claim to assert (otherwise nonexistent) authority over
subsequent generations. Suppose, for example, that we (the current
generation of Americans) follow this rationale and agree to accede to
the otherwise nonbinding constitutional commands of our
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors. And suppose we
then attempt to express our own popular sovereignty by amending

115. On this point, see PETERS, supra note 42, at 53–57.
116. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 127–52.
117. Id. at 133.
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the Constitution to bind future generations, or perhaps even
“remaking” it altogether as Whittington suggests. What moral
obligation can this impose on those future generations? They cannot
be bound by our consent to the existing Constitution, any more than
they can be bound by our act of consenting to a new constitution.
What we consent to is our business; what they consent to is theirs.
We the People are not they the People.
If our consent can’t bind future generations, Whittington’s
rationale for giving that consent disappears. The dead-hand problem
reemerges unresolved, and the idea of “government by consent”
becomes simply loose talk. Consent cannot underwrite the authority
of the Constitution, and so it cannot underwrite originalism or any
other methodology for interpreting it.
V. AUTHORITY BY MORAL GUIDANCE
So far we have ruled out two accounts of constitutional authority
that might be thought to justify originalism, for two different
reasons. Values Imposition accounts are not really accounts of
authority at all, because they provide no content-independent reason
to obey the Constitution. Consent accounts might provide such a
reason, but they are descriptively implausible under the conditions
that obtain in the United States or, most likely, in any other modern
democracy.
This section explores a third alternative, one that is less
immediately recognizable than Consent but probably more prevalent
and, as it turns out, considerably more nuanced. The account is less
recognizable because those who employ or endorse it often do so
implicitly and rarely acknowledge the common thread tying their
views to the seemingly dissimilar views of others. I will refer to this
justification of constitutional authority as a Moral Guidance account.

A. The Normative Force of Moral Guidance
According to a Moral Guidance account, the authority of
constitutional law rests in the comparatively superior moral wisdom
of the process (or processes) that created it. Our reason to obey
constitutional commands is not that we have consented to them, or
that they will generate particular results we prefer (as on a Values
Imposition account), but rather that obeying the Constitution is
more likely to lead us to good results than is ordinary democratic
1297
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politics—whatever those good results might be and however their
goodness might be assessed.
As we saw from the failure of Values Imposition accounts,
constitutional authority cannot be built on the desire to achieve
particular (controversial) values or other outcomes. One way of
stating the reason why is to note that those who disagree with the
values or outcomes in question would recognize no reason to
acknowledge the Constitution’s authority. But as Jeremy Waldron
points out, we might be able to attribute authority to procedures we
think are likely to generate good outcomes, even if we can’t agree
ahead of time on what those outcomes are:
Instead of saying (in a question-begging way) that we should
choose those political procedures that are most likely to yield a
particular controversial set of rights [or moral values or other
outcomes], we might say instead that we should choose political
procedures that are most likely to get at the truth about rights [or
values, or outcomes, etc.], whatever that truth turns out to be. 118

If we can agree that constitutional procedures are, generally
speaking, more likely to generate morally good outcomes (with
respect to certain matters, at least) than are ordinary democratic
procedures, we might then attribute authority to constitutional law
even if we disagree with some of the particular results it produces. A
useful analogy is the policy of subjecting children to their parents’
control until they turn eighteen. We may not agree with every
decision a given parent makes, but we think parents are, as a general
matter, more likely to make good decisions regarding the child’s
welfare than is the child herself (or, for that matter, other potential
decision-makers, such as the state). So we generally cede decisionmaking authority to parents, knowing that we will not agree with
how they exercise that authority in every instance.
Grounding constitutional authority in the general capacity for
moral guidance, not in particular moral values or outcomes, can skirt
the content-dependence problem that dooms Values Imposition
accounts. Of course, Moral Guidance accounts cannot provide a
reason to obey constitutional commands one knows to be morally
erroneous; they cannot provide a reason to do the wrong thing. But
they can leverage the ubiquitous fact of uncertainty about morality to

118. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1573–74.
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create a reason to obey commands one thinks are erroneous. The
premise of Moral Guidance accounts is that the constitutional
process is more likely to generate morally good outcomes than the
alternatives. If one accepts this premise, then one has a reason to
obey even a constitutional outcome with which one disagrees. That
reason is that the constitutional process is more likely to have gotten
it right, morally speaking, than the alternative decision-making
procedures—including the exercise of one’s own judgment.
This reason for obedience stems from one’s own uncertainty
about what morality requires, and from one’s willingness to defer to
the constitutional process in cases of uncertainty. Again, parental
authority is a good analogy: even if we disagree with a particular
decision a parent makes about her child, our general confidence in
the comparative superiority of parental decision-making gives us
reason to defer to that decision anyway.
Some influential constitutional theories attribute—or can be read
to attribute—this sort of Moral Guidance authority to the act (or
acts) of constitutional Framing. Consider again the views expressed
by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78, which we explored in
discussing Consent in the previous Part. Hamilton asserted that the
“solemn and authoritative act” of creating a constitution was
superior to whatever might result from the “ill humors” and
“momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics. 119 Viewed as a
Consent theory, Hamilton’s hierarchy is unconvincing, at least
insofar as it contemplates imposing constitutional law on
subsequent (nonconsenting) generations. In the alternative,
however, we might read Hamilton’s hierarchy as the expression of a
Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority. Hamilton might
be claiming authority for constitutional law, not on the ground that
“the people” consented to the Constitution, but rather on the theory
that something special about the “solemn . . . act” of
constitutional lawmaking—its deliberativeness, perhaps, or its
broadly participatory scope—renders that process more reliable as a
source of moral wisdom than the flighty procedures of everyday
politics, with its “ill humors” and “momentary inclination[s].” 120
Or consider Bruce Ackerman’s “dualist democracy.” Perhaps the
normative force of Ackerman’s “higher lawmaking” flows, not from

119. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440.
120. Id.
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the mere fact that “the People” have consented to it, but from the
way in which they consented: by means of an extraordinarily
deliberative and participatory process that occurred over an extended
period of time and garnered the acquiescence of a diverse assortment
of viewpoints and interests. Our reason for treating constitutional
law as higher law, on this Moral Guidance version of Ackerman’s
theory, is our confidence in the relative wisdom of this process—our
belief that constitutional lawmaking is more likely to get things
right, morally speaking, than is normal democratic politics.
A Moral Guidance justification of originalism might deflect the
content-dependence problem of a Values Imposition account, as I’ve
explained. And Moral Guidance seems more plausible than a
Consent account, at least as an initial matter, because it does not
depend on the problematic notion that most or all Americans today
have somehow consented to be bound by what the Framers decided
generations ago. Moral Guidance accounts depend, rather, on our
acceptance of the process of constitutional Framing as a procedure
that is “most likely to get at the truth” about rights or other moral
matters, in Waldron’s phrase. 121

B. Moral Guidance and Originalism
It is not difficult to see how this type of Moral Guidance account
might underwrite originalism. If our reason for obeying the
Constitution stems from the special moral wisdom of the Framing or
ratification process, then we ought to identify those judgments
actually made by the Framers (or approved by the ratifiers) and apply
them, so far as we can, to current problems. It is the Framers’ or the
ratifiers’ judgments that contain the comparative moral wisdom that
justifies obedience; the further away we move from actual judgments
of the Framers or ratifiers, the more attenuated our reason for
obeying the Constitution becomes. Nonoriginalist constitutional law
therefore is not (authoritative) law at all; it has no claim to our
obedience. If we want constitutional law to be law, we have to
interpret and apply it using an originalist methodology.
And in fact some originalists expressly ground their
methodology in Moral Guidance accounts. The most prominent
example is the work of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, 122

121. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1374.
122. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism, supra note 29; John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) [hereinafter
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who argue that requirements of super-majoritarian approval, like
those used to adopt the original Constitution and those that apply to
subsequent amendments, tend to produce rules that are conducive to
the public good. This is so, McGinnis and Rappaport contend,
because super-majoritarian requirements necessitate broad
consensus 123 and, given the difficulty of amending the rules they
generate, impose a sort of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” that
discourages narrowly self-interested rule-making. 124 Obtaining the
benefits of the super-majoritarian procedures of the Framing
requires implementing rules actually approved by those
procedures—that is, it requires originalist methodology. 125

C. Framing-focused and Court-focused Accounts
At the risk of complicating my terminology, I will refer to the
type of Moral Guidance account described to this point—one that
locates special moral wisdom in the process (or processes) of
Framing and/or ratifying the Constitution or its amendments—as a
Framing-focused account. I do this to distinguish it from another
prevalent variant of Moral Guidance, which we might call a Courtfocused account.
Some theorists can be read to ascribe special moral wisdom—not
to the Framing, but rather to the process of subsequent
constitutional adjudication. (Not coincidentally, these theorists
usually are concerned with justifying judicial review in particular,
not constitutional law more generally.) Hamilton wore this hat as
well. In Federalist No. 78, he argued that “the independence of the
McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis &
Rappaport, Pragmatic Defense].
123. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution, supra note 122, at 1704–06, 1710–19.
124. See id. at 1706–10.
125. See id. at 1733–53. Note that the particulars of the Framing-focused Moral Guidance
account in question seem likely to determine the type of originalist methodology that should be
used. If we attribute the special moral wisdom of the Framing to characteristics of the overall
process, as Hamilton, Ackerman, and McGinnis and Rappaport seem to do—to its participatory
and deliberative nature, for example, or to the super-majority requirement—then we ought to
prefer the sort of “original public meaning” approach favored by most current originalists. That
approach, after all, seems most likely to capture the superior wisdom in question, which flows
(on this view) from the broadly public nature of the Framing. On the other hand, if we attribute
special wisdom to something about the Framers themselves—to their extraordinary erudition or
foresight or abilities as statesmen, say—then we should look more specifically for actual
intentions or judgments of those particular people (an “original intentions” approach that is
currently out of fashion).
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judges” from the political process would allow them to safeguard
individual rights against “those ill humors which . . . sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves.” 126 The implication is
that judicial review is a more trustworthy safeguard of rights than
ordinary democracy—and thus that we ought to obey judicial rulings
on rights as opposed to democratic decisions where the two conflict.
The mid-twentieth-century theorist Alexander Bickel, in a
similar vein, defended the “counter-majoritarian force” of judicial
review on the ground that “courts have certain capacities for dealing
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not
possess.” 127 Many contemporary proponents of judicial review—
Christopher Eisgruber, Lawrence Sager, and Ronald Dworkin among
or
them—similarly
cite
the
“disinterestedness” 128
129
“detach[ment]”
of life-tenured judges, or the “republican
deliberation” characteristic of constitutional adjudication, 130 as
grounds for assigning certain issues of “principle” or “justice” to the
courts.
Framing-focused accounts point toward originalism, as we’ve
seen. But Court-focused accounts need not support originalism and
might very well oppose it. If life-tenured judges have special
“capacities for dealing with matters of principle,” requiring them to
locate and implement decisions made by long-dead Framers would
seem a wasted effort. Why not simply allow these judges to engage
with issues of principle directly? (It is perhaps no accident that none
of these recent Court-focused theorists pays much attention in his
work to the Framing process, or that none of them is an
originalist.) 131
That said, there is nothing inconsistent about endorsing both
Framing-focused and Court-focused versions of Moral Guidance, as
Hamilton can be read to do. It might be the case that both the
126. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440.
127. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 25 (2d ed. 1986).
128. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 57 (2001).
129. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 74 (2004).
130. RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 31 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW].
131. Dworkin’s critique of originalism is well-known, and its influence is evident in the
critiques of Eisgruber and Sager, among others. See DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
22, at 33–57; EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 25–44; SAGER, supra note 129, at 30–69.
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Framing process and the process of subsequent constitutional
adjudication—individually, perhaps, or in combination—are morally
wiser on the relevant issues than the processes of normal democratic
lawmaking. Indeed, it would seem that New Originalists who
distinguish between constitutional “interpretation” (the derivation
of the text’s original meaning) and constitutional “construction”
(the application of the text to a particular issue when original
meaning is underdeterminate) 132 would have to adopt some sort of
hybrid account in order to justify both the act of interpretation and
the act of construction. This point actually presents a difficulty for
New Originalism, but I will put it aside for now and return to it in
Part VI.E.
In my observation, these Court-focused versions of the Moral
Guidance account handily outnumber their Framing-focused
counterparts. If I am right about this, it might hint at something
about the plausibility of Framing-focused versions, and of the
originalism that flows from them. It is to this question of plausibility
that I turn next.

D. The Implausibility of Framing-focused Moral Guidance
Framing-focused Moral Guidance accounts avoid the salient
objections that apply to Values Imposition and Consent accounts.
But they come with their own baggage. The claims they make about
the superior moral wisdom of the Framing as a general matter are
subject to reasonable doubt, to say the least. In particular cases,
moreover, those claims will be especially vulnerable, for two related
reasons. First, particular cases often will involve issues that the
Framing generation could not have anticipated and therefore could
not have used its supposedly superior wisdom to resolve. Second,
the fact that a person subject to a constitutional command disagrees
with the substance of that command will serve, for that person, as a
reason to doubt the moral wisdom of the process that generated it,
and thus to reject the command’s authority in that case.
I will address each of these problems in turn, using the case of a
hypothetical member of Congress, Cato, who must decide whether
to obey the Constitution despite his disagreement with its content in
his case. Suppose Cato is asked to vote for a bill that would allow

132. On this distinction, see the discussion in Part III.A, supra.
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suspected terrorists to be detained indefinitely without trial. Cato
thinks the bill is good policy, perhaps even necessary for national
security. But he also believes the bill would violate the
Constitution’s guarantee of due process of law. What reason does
Cato have to obey the Constitution despite his substantive
disagreement with the outcome of doing so?

1. The salient defects of the Framing
On a Framing-focused account, Cato’s reason to obey the
Constitution is that the Framing process was morally wiser than the
ordinary democratic process of which he is a part. Thus Cato is more
likely to do the right thing, morally speaking, by obeying the
Constitution than by acting on his own democratic judgment. But
Cato will have good cause to doubt the underlying premise of this
account.
The generation that framed the original Constitution (ratified in
1788) and the Bill of Rights (1791) tolerated slavery, and indeed
affirmatively protected it in the document. 133 It excluded women,
most people of color, and many non-propertied people from the
vote. 134 It viewed Native Americans as uncivilized savages and
barred most of them from citizenship altogether. 135 Whatever
decisional advantages might have flowed from the unusually
participatory and deliberative nature of the Framing may well seem,
to Cato, to have been compromised, if not entirely negated, by these
salient exclusions from the process. And the supposed moral
wisdom of those who did participate will appear suspect in light of
their tolerance (often their endorsement) of slavery, colonial
genocide, racism, gender hierarchy, and property-based oligarchy.
Now it may seem that a requirement that the Framing process
generally be morally wiser than ordinary politics sets the bar too high.
A Framing-focused account demands only that the Framing process
be relatively wise with respect to certain issues—namely those

133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 prohibited Congress from banning the importation of
slaves until 1808. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 prohibited free states from emancipating or
harboring escaped slaves. In addition, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 counted slaves as three-fifths
of a person for purposes of congressional representation (and therefore also representation in
the electoral college, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2) and direct taxation.
134. See sources cited supra notes 94–98.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, for example, entirely excludes “Indians not taxed” from
the population to be counted for representation purposes.
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governed by the Constitution. But in fact this demand is more
ambitious than it may at first appear. The Framing process, after all,
determined both what to include in the Constitution and what to
leave out of it. If Cato and the rest of us are bound by the
Constitution, we are bound both by what the Constitution
contains—by rules like the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause—and also by what the Constitution does not contain, in the
sense that we are not free to give constitutional status to rules the
Framers did not in fact include in the Constitution. So, for example,
when originalists criticize decisions like Roe v. Wade for illegitimately
“creating” or “expanding” constitutional rights, they are claiming
that the judges who decided those cases were disobeying the
Constitution, not by failing to implement rules it includes, but rather
by implementing rules it does not include.
If Cato is to defer to the judgments of the Framing generation
with respect to the rules they included in the Constitution, then he
also must defer to their judgments with respect to the rules they left
out of it. Cato must defer to the Framing, for example, on questions
involving the rights to life, liberty, and property—subjects included
within the scope of the Due Process Clauses—and also on questions
involving claimed rights to, say, education or health care, subjects
(arguably) not included within the scope of those clauses. Cato must
treat life, liberty, and property as constitutionally protected, and he
must treat education or health care as not constitutionally
protected. 136
On a Moral Guidance account, this means Cato must attribute to
the Framing a moral wisdom that is quite broad—wisdom not only
with respect to the rules included in the Constitution, but also with
respect to the choice of which rules to include and which rules to
omit. It will not be enough, on a Framing-focused account, for Cato

136. The fact that Cato and others subject to constitutional law are prohibited from
treating these entitlements as constitutional in stature does not, of course, prevent Congress or
other sub-constitutional lawmakers from protecting them through statutes or other subconstitutional means. To be bound by the Framers’ decision not to include these rights in the
Constitution is to be bound by their decision to leave these issues to ordinary, subconstitutional democratic politics. And I should make it clear that I am not assuming that rights
to education or to health care cannot in fact legitimately be found in the Constitution. These
seem like plausible examples of subjects “left out” of the Constitution, but there may be
reasonable arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., SAGER, supra note 129, at 87–88 (suggesting that
the right to medical care is part of a constitutionally guaranteed, but judicially unenforceable,
“right to minimum welfare”). I use them here only by way of example.
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to believe that the Framing possessed superior moral wisdom on
issues covered by constitutional rules, like the protection of life,
liberty, and property, or the freedom of speech and religion, or
equality, or the regulation of interstate commerce. Cato also will
have to believe that the Framing was comparatively wise with
respect to issues not covered by constitutional rules, like education
and health care.
Moral Guidance accounts thus make bold claims about the
relative moral wisdom of the Framing. It is quite unlikely that our
actual Framing can live up to these claims, given its salient
substantive misjudgments (the protection of slavery, for example)
and its troubling procedural defects (the omission of women, of
most people of color, and of many nonpropertied citizens). So it will
take a very big leap of faith for Cato to buy into the Framing-focused
Moral Guidance account in the first place.

2. The problem of unforeseen circumstances
But suppose Cato does accept the Moral Guidance premise that
the Framing process, as a general matter, is morally wiser than he is
(as a participant in ordinary democratic politics). Cato still might
reasonably reject that premise as applied to his particular case.
In creating the rule embodied in the Due Process Clause—“No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law”—the Framing generation, after all, could not
have had the facts of his case in mind. Americans in the late
eighteenth century had no experience of world-wide terrorist
movements, the threat of nuclear or biological terrorism, the
hijacking of jetliners for use as passenger-laden missiles, or for that
matter of a society anywhere near as ideologically, racially,
ethnically, and religiously diverse as our own. Indeed they could not
have anticipated these developments with even the remotest degree
of accuracy. In requiring due process for the deprivation of liberty,
then, the Framing generation was not bringing its (by-hypothesis)
superior moral wisdom to bear on anything like the actual problem
Cato now faces.
So even if Cato is inclined to defer to the judgments of the
Framing as a general matter, he has no reason to defer to the
judgment of the Framing as applied to his particular case—simply
because there is no such judgment to defer to. The rule embodied in
the Due Process Clause does not reflect a specific judgment about
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how the facts of Cato’s case, unforeseen and unforeseeable by the
Framers, should be resolved.
To be clear, the problem here is not that there is no
constitutional law on the issue Cato faces. Cato, remember, has
interpreted the Due Process Clause to prohibit the bill he is
considering. So we are putting to one side the underdeterminacy
issues that might hinder the identification of “original meaning” in
any given case. 137 The problem at hand, rather, is that the (byhypothesis) applicable legal rule does not reflect (cannot reflect) an
actual judgment by the rule-maker—the Framing process—with
respect to the particular circumstances confronting Cato. In enacting
a general rule that covers Cato’s case, the Framers did not
specifically consider Cato’s case itself. In this respect, the Due
Process Clause is no different from most general normative rules: it
applies by its terms to cases that its enactors could not have
foreseen. 138
Nor is the problem here the worry that the Framing process, had
it actually considered these circumstances, would not or might not
have resolved them wisely. The problem is that the Framing process
did not consider these circumstances and thus did not resolve them
at all. So Cato cannot know how the Framing would have resolved his
case if it had considered it. And he cannot defer to a nonexistent
judgment. 139
137. On the typical underdeterminacy of original meaning and the consequent need,
recognized by most New Originalists, for constitutional “construction,” see the discussions in
Part III.A, supra, and in Part III.C, supra, in the text accompanying notes 63–72.
138. This is one cause of the phenomenon noted by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics:
that “all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct.” ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927,
1020 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans. 1941). General normative rules often produce
“incorrect” results in particular cases because those cases involve circumstances the rule-makers
did not anticipate.
139. Of course, Cato could attempt to construct a specific judgment that the Framers might
have rendered had they considered the particular circumstances he faces. If Cato attempts this,
however, he has left the realm of descriptive identifications of judgments actually made by the
Framers, and entered the very different sphere of normatively infused imaginings of what the
Framers would or could or should have decided. Whatever comparative moral wisdom resides in
the judgments of the Framers has become attenuated and perhaps has been completely
abandoned. In this sense, the construction of counterfactual “judgments” of the Framers
resembles the construction of hypothetical “consent.” See supra Part IV.G. With both devices,
whatever normative force flows from the fact of an actual decision (of the Framers, or of the
consenting party) is lost when imagined decisions are substituted for actual ones.
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Note, too, that this problem cuts in two directions: it afflicts
both cases where a constitutional rule applies and cases where no
constitutional rule applies. In Cato’s case, his obedience to an
applicable constitutional rule (“No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) would not be
justified by the premise of the Framing-focused account, because
there is no specific judgment of the Framing to defer to in his case.
But imagine a case in which no constitutional rule applies.
Suppose, for example, that an originalist judge in 1954—call him
Gaius—must decide whether enforced racial segregation in public
schools should be declared unconstitutional; and suppose that Gaius
believes that the original meaning of the applicable constitutional
provision, which provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”
allows school segregation. By Gaius’s lights, there is no
constitutional rule on the issue of segregation: the Constitution
neither prohibits it nor requires it.140
Nonetheless, Gaius might conclude that because the process of
framing the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the equalprotection rule, did not consider (could not have considered) “public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation” in 1954, 141 there is no actual
judgment of the Framing to defer to. And thus Gaius reasonably
might decide to, in effect, disobey the Constitution by ruling that the
Constitution prohibits school segregation, on the ground that the
Framing-focused Moral Guidance account offers no reason to defer
to a nonexistent judgment of the Framing. Gaius’s disobedience
would take the form, not of disobeying an existing constitutional
rule, but rather of enforcing a nonexistent one. 142

140. Or we might say, without affecting the substance of the argument, that there is a
constitutional rule allowing (but not prohibiting or requiring) school segregation.
141. This language is of course taken from the Supreme Court’s actual decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 387 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954), in which the Court held that enforced racial
segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause. One way to read Brown (not
the only way, and probably not the best way) is as an act of justified disobedience of the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—disobedience, because the original meaning of the
Clause allowed school segregation; justified, because the Framing-focused Moral Guidance
account offers no reason to obey the Constitution absent a specific judgment of the Framing.
142. Or (again) we might say that Gaius has disobeyed an existing constitutional rule to
the effect that school segregation is allowed (but not prohibited or required).
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We can begin to perceive now the serious plausibility problems
that afflict Framing-focused Moral Guidance accounts. Those
accounts make ambitious claims about the general moral wisdom of
the Framing process, claims that are substantially undermined by the
salient moral errors and process deficiencies of the actual Framing.
And they require a relatively specific judgment by the Framing in any
given case, a judgment that is increasingly unlikely to exist as we
move farther away from the world the Framing generation knew.

3. The problem of disagreement
Cutting across these two considerable difficulties is a third: a
person subject to constitutional law, like Cato or Gaius, will disagree
with the substance of the Constitution in any case that matters. A
subject who agrees with what the Constitution requires in her case
will of course simply do whatever that thing is; she will not need to
ask whether to obey the Constitution at all. Constitutional authority
(like all legal authority) makes a real difference only when a legal
subject disagrees with the content of a constitutional command.
The problem for Moral Guidance accounts, however, is that a
subject’s disagreement with a constitutional command also serves as
a reason to reject that command’s authority. This is because
substantive disagreement constitutes evidence that the basis of that
authority—the superior moral wisdom of the Framing process—does
not in fact exist.
Consider Cato’s belief that the terrorist-detention bill is morally
good policy. The Framing-focused Moral Guidance account tells Cato
that, despite this belief, he should obey the Due Process Clause and
vote against the bill because the process of framing that Clause was
morally wiser than he (as part of the democratic process) is. But
Cato’s moral approval of the bill is evidence, for Cato, that the
Clause’s prohibition of the bill is morally incorrect; and this in turn
is evidence that the Framing process that authored the Clause was
not so morally wise after all. Cato’s disagreement with the content of
constitutional law thus gives Cato reason to question the authority of
constitutional law. And the requirement of content-independence—
that legal authority be based on something other than the moral
content of the law in question—is undermined.
I said in Part V.A that a Moral Guidance account cannot provide
a reason to obey constitutional commands one knows to be
erroneous; Moral Guidance accounts require uncertainty about the
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requirements of morality. We can assume for purposes of the
argument that Cato is afflicted by this uncertainty and that most
actual subjects of constitutional law share this prevalent human
affliction. This is not the same thing, however, as assuming that
subjects of constitutional law like Cato typically lack strong beliefs
about the requirements of morality. It seems likely that most people
in a position to decide whether to obey the Constitution will, most
of the time, have their own views about what morality requires.
(Indeed we should hope this is the case, as a world in which
legislators, government officials, and for that matter ordinary
citizens typically are entirely at sea about what they ought to do
would be a very scary place in which to live.) So we can assume that
decision-makers like Cato, while recognizing their own uncertainty
about what morality requires, will at the same time have beliefs
about what morality requires, beliefs upon which they would feel
comfortable acting absent a constitutional command to the contrary.
To believe that morality requires some action (X) is to believe
that a command to do not-X is morally incorrect. If Cato believes,
then, that morality requires X—say, the detention without trial of
suspected terrorists—then Cato necessarily also believes that a
command to the contrary—say, the constitutional requirement of
due process of law—is morally incorrect. Now this belief by itself
need not convince Cato to disobey the constitutional command.
Cato, we are assuming, accepts the premise of the Moral Guidance
account that the Constitution, in essence, is more likely to be
morally correct than he is. Cato’s acceptance of this premise might
convince him to disregard his (inconsistent) belief that the
Constitution is, in this instance, morally incorrect.
But Cato’s belief that the Constitution is morally incorrect in
this instance will serve as evidence, for Cato, against the proposition
that the Constitution is more likely to be morally correct than he is.
Consider again the analogy of parental authority. We can accept the
premise that parents, generally speaking, are the best decisionmakers about their children’s welfare while simultaneously believing
that a particular parental decision is incorrect. But our belief that a
particular decision is wrong may undermine our acceptance of the
general premise of parental authority. If we perceive a certain
parental judgment—say, the decision not to inoculate one’s
children—as especially foolish, our confidence in the general
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principle of superior parental decision-making capacity will be called
into doubt.
And note that—crucially—we need not reject the premise of
parental authority as a general matter in order to determine that it
fails in this particular case. We may believe that parents are the best
decision-makers for their children in many more cases than not, and
even that these particular parents are the best decision-makers in
many more cases than not, while still concluding, based on this one
(by our lights) extraordinarily foolish decision, that these parents are
not the best decision-makers in this case. Our belief that a particular
decision is wrong, in other words, may convince us that this case is
an exception to the general rule of parental authority.
The same possibility obtains with respect to Cato. Cato’s belief
that the requirement of due process is morally erroneous in his case
might lead him to question the (already questionable) underlying
premise of constitutional authority, namely the supposedly superior
wisdom of the Framing process. Or, less dramatically, it might cause
him to reject the application of that premise to his particular case,
even as he continues to accept it more generally. Cato might
conclude that because the Constitution (by his lights) is morally
wrong in this case, the premise of superior constitutional wisdom
therefore does not apply in this case. And so Cato might conclude
that the Constitution simply does not possess authority in his case;
he has no duty to obey its command.
Note, too, that the persuasiveness of this reasoning is enhanced
to the extent there are independent grounds to question the wisdom
of the Constitution. And under a Framing-focused Moral Guidance
account, as we have already seen, at least two independent grounds
are likely to exist in any given case. The first is the set of reasons to
question the plausibility of Framing-focused accounts as a general
matter: the arbitrarily exclusionary nature of the Framing and the
saliently erroneous moral judgments made by the Framers. The
second is the unlikelihood that the Framers considered any given set
of circumstances like Cato’s when they framed their constitutional
rules.
These grounds, in combination with the evidentiary force of
disagreement, spell trouble for a Framing-focused account. In order
for the account to work, legal subjects like Cato will have to accept
its rather questionable premise of generally superior moral wisdom;
they will have to agree that this premise applies specifically to a
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given case the Framers are unlikely to (perhaps could not) have
foreseen; and they will have to do so in spite of their substantive
disagreement with the constitutional law in that case and their
consequent doubt about the basis for the law’s authority.

4. The failure of the Framing-focused account
At bottom, then, the Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach
is not a very persuasive grounding of constitutional authority. Part of
the problem is context-sensitive: the salient moral failings of the
American Framing are not inevitable features of any constitutional
system. Nonetheless, they are features of the system we have. And
the other components of the problem seem more universal. No
process of constitution-making can envision every circumstance in
which its rules will apply; as a constitution gets older and older, this
shortcoming will become more and more relevant. And every
constitution must be capable of motivating obedience even by those
who strongly disagree with the substance of its commands. If the
only ground for obedience is Moral Guidance, then, constitutional
authority often will fail, in our system or in any other.
Of course, if a Framing-focused Moral Guidance account cannot
persuasively justify constitutional authority itself, then it cannot
persuasively dictate originalism or any other method of
constitutional interpretation. Framing-focused accounts are less
saliently implausible than Values Imposition and Consent accounts,
but they turn out not to be plausible enough.

E. A Word About Court-focused Accounts
Although I won’t linger on Court-focused versions of Moral
Guidance here (because they do not seem to support originalism), I
should note before moving on that the difficulties of Framingfocused accounts will affect Court-focused accounts as well, though
perhaps not quite so severely. Supreme Court decision-making does
not feature the obviously exclusionary defects of our Framing, but it
does feature many arguable defects of its own. The Court is an elite
institution populated solely by lawyers, a disproportionate number
of whom are white, male, and middle-aged or beyond. At any given
time, moreover, it consists of no more than nine members,
substantially limiting its experience of, and need to engage with,
diverse viewpoints and interests as compared to democratic politics.
The notion that the Justices decide cases free of political, moral, or
1312
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other predispositions or biases has long been discredited. As with
the Framing, then, though mostly for different reasons, the idea that
the Court is substantially wiser than ordinary democracy on the
subjects covered (and not covered) by constitutional law is at the
very least problematic.
The problem of unforeseen circumstances may not be as acute on
Court-focused accounts as on their Framing-focused rivals, simply
because the Court (unlike the Framing) is an ongoing institution
capable of addressing new issues as they arise. In practice, however,
a Court that decides fewer than 100 cases per year, most of which
are not constitutional cases, cannot of course specifically address
every possible variant of a given constitutional problem. There will
be many cases of first impression that the Court has not directly
considered, even though they are covered by some general rule or
principle announced by the Court.
And the problem of disagreement applies to judicially created
rules or commands just as it applies to rules or commands
promulgated by the Framers. A person subject to a judicial doctrine
or decision with which she strongly disagrees is just as likely, for
that reason, to question the supposedly superior wisdom of the
institution that issued that doctrine or decision as is a person subject
to an original constitutional rule she finds disagreeable.
I am deeply skeptical, in short, that any version of a Moral
Guidance account can convincingly justify the authority of
constitutional law. But Court-focused accounts seem slightly less
hopeless—or perhaps just hopeless in different ways—than the type
of Framing-focused account that might entail originalism.
VI. AUTHORITY BY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
There is one more prevalent account of constitutional authority
that might be used to justify originalism. I call it a Dispute Resolution
account, and I explore it in this Part. In its most popular (and in my
view most persuasive) form—what I call the Footnote Four version—
Dispute Resolution can justify at most a selective use of originalism.
Another form of Dispute Resolution (the Rule of Law version) has
been offered in support of originalism; but it provides weak support
at best and, more to the point, it is not particularly convincing as an
account of authority.
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A. The Normative Force of Dispute Resolution
There is a long and not entirely user-friendly history of justifying
law as a means of resolving, avoiding, or mitigating disputes.
Dispute resolution was at the core of Hobbes’s now-infamous
defense of absolute monarchy: absolutist law, Hobbes thought, was
necessary to avoid the conflict and chaos that would prevail in a state
of nature. 143 Though Locke’s thought often is contrasted with that of
Hobbes, and in particular is frequently cited for the proposition that
government exists to protect natural rights, Locke too justified law
at least in part as a way to resolve or avoid costly disputes. Locke’s
central objection to Hobbes, in fact, was his observation that a
Hobbesian absolute monarch frequently would be self-interested and
thus incapable of resolving disputes fairly. 144
A somewhat oversimplified version of Hobbes’s account
illustrates the basic normative mechanics of Dispute Resolution. We
are obligated to obey the sovereign, Hobbes suggested, because
failure to obey will leave disputes unresolved, allowing society to fall
into chaos. 145 This obligation applies even—indeed especially—
when we disagree with the sovereign’s commands; if we were free to
disobey in cases of disagreement, the dispute-avoidance function of
the sovereign would be entirely frustrated. The sovereign, in other
words, has authority over us, not by virtue of its superior wisdom (a
Moral Guidance account) or our agreement to be bound (a Consent
account), but simply because obedience is the only way to avoid
extremely costly disputes.
Notice that the goal of dispute resolution (or avoidance, or
mitigation) on this account provides a content-independent reason
for action. It gives us a reason (in Hobbes’s view, a duty) to obey
legal commands regardless of the content of those commands—
regardless of whether what the sovereign orders us to do otherwise
would be morally correct. Our disagreement with the content of a

143. See generally HOBBES, supra note 80.
144. See LOCKE, supra note 81, at 316–17, 369–74. For an extended discussion of Locke’s
dispute-resolution account of law and government, and in particular his critique of Hobbes, see
PETERS, supra note 42, at 119–22.
145. In fact Hobbes filtered his dispute-resolution justification of law through the device of
constructive consent: he argued in essence that subjects ought to obey an absolute monarch
because, acting rationally, they would have consented to absolute monarchy, given the
opportunity to do so, as a way to avoid chaos and violence. See PETERS, supra note 42, at 57–59.
But we can put this consensualist overlay to one side for present purposes.
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command is irrelevant to our duty to obey it. (Dispute Resolution
accounts thus avoid the fatal flaw of Values Imposition accounts.)
Moreover, our disagreement with the content of a command is not,
by itself, evidence that the sovereign lacks authority over us—unlike
on Moral Guidance accounts, which make authority contingent on
superior moral wisdom. Conceptually speaking, then, a Hobbesian
Dispute Resolution account has advantages over the Values
Imposition and Moral Guidance alternatives. And descriptively
speaking it is, or at least might be, an improvement on Consent
accounts, because it does not demand that we (the subjects of law)
give our actual consent to be bound by that law.
We might take this basic Hobbesian idea and deploy it to fashion
a Dispute Resolution account of the authority of the Constitution. If
the costs of obeying constitutional law are lower than the costs of
the disputes that would result, or remain, if we disobey, then we
have a content-independent, Hobbesian reason to obey the
Constitution. We have, that is, an account of constitutional
authority.
Of course, we are going to have to do much better than this bare
Hobbesian account to justify constitutional authority convincingly.
As Locke observed, the costs of obeying the law when that law is
made by an absolutist monarch often will outweigh the costs of the
alternatives. An absolutist monarch, after all, will be prone to
“resolve” disputes in his own favor, leading to the sort of “long train
of abuses” of which both Locke and, later, Thomas Jefferson (in the
Declaration of Independence) complained. 146 So we will need to
explain why the Constitution is a particularly trustworthy resolver of
disputes—why it is especially impartial or fair, for example, in
comparison to the alternatives—in order to endorse constitutional
authority on Dispute Resolution grounds.
As it happens, we have such an account available to us. It is the
account suggested by the Supreme Court in the famous fourth
footnote of Carolene Products and later elucidated by the
constitutional theorist John Hart Ely.

B. Footnote Four
In what has become known as “Footnote Four,” the Court in its
1938 decision in Carolene Products suggested that aggressive judicial

146. See LOCKE, supra note 81, at 463; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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review of legislation is appropriate in circumstances where the
democratic process cannot be trusted. The source of distrust might
be the fact that the legislation in question “restricts . . . political
processes,” 147 such as a law penalizing criticism of the sitting
government. Or it might be a worry that the legislation reflects or
perpetuates “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,” 148
such as a law requiring racial segregation in public schools.
The Carolene Court offered its account only as a tentative
rationale for non-deferential judicial review in some circumstances;
John Hart Ely later expanded it into a rationale for judicial review
itself.149 Carefully considered, and perhaps enlarged somewhat, a
version of the Footnote Four approach might in fact be deployed for
greater purposes still: to ground the general authority of
constitutional law. 150 The account acknowledges, first, that ordinary
democratic politics are the preferred, default mechanism for
resolving society’s disputes about substantive values and outcomes,
and thus for making law. But it holds that democratic politics cannot
always be relied upon to resolve substantive disputes acceptably. The
“ins”—those currently holding political power, namely the electoral
majority and those who represent them in office—have strong
incentives to “make sure the outs stay out,” as Ely put it. 151 So
legislation that has this effect—legislation restricting political speech
or voting rights, for example—cannot be trusted as genuinely in the
public interest; it might simply be a self-interested gambit to
consolidate power. Rules of constitutional law (such as protections
for freedom of speech) can make it difficult to enact these powerentrenching measures. Constitutional adjudication, moreover, can
fairly resolve disputes over whether any given measure is in fact
unjustifiably power-entrenching.
In a similar vein, majoritarian democracy sometimes is distorted
by irrational biases against certain groups of citizens—those
possessing disfavored racial or ethnic traits or religious beliefs, for
example. The views and interests of these citizens might not be

147. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
148. Id.
149. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
150. Elsewhere I have described and defended at length a justification of constitutional law
that might be considered an expanded version of the Footnote Four account. See PETERS, supra
note 42, at 246–348.
151. ELY, supra note 149, at 106.
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taken seriously in the political process, and as a result, they might be
unfairly denied benefits or saddled with burdens, as (for example)
with Jim Crow laws in the pre-Civil-Rights-era South. Constitutional
rules (such as a requirement of “equal protection of the laws”) can
prevent or mitigate this kind of biased legislation; constitutional
adjudication can resolve disputes about whether any given law is
unfairly biased.
The Footnote Four approach therefore justifies constitutional
law and adjudication on Dispute Resolution grounds. It holds that
establishing, obeying, and applying certain constitutional rules will
resolve some disputes better than ordinary democracy could resolve
them. A person’s reason to obey a constitutional command with
which she disagrees, on this account, is that doing so will resolve (or
avoid or mitigate) some costly disagreement that otherwise would
not be so well resolved (or avoided or mitigated).
The Footnote Four approach depends, of course, on the premise
that constitutional law and procedures are better than ordinary
democracy at resolving the kinds of disputes to which they apply.
Our justification of constitutional authority must be better than
Hobbes’s attempt to justify absolute monarchy; it must demonstrate
that constitutional law can resolve disputes, not simply by force, but
in a way that both sides can accept. (Recall in this regard Jeremy
Waldron’s central requirement for a dispute-resolving procedure: it
must be capable of being “subscribed to by people on both sides of
any . . . disagreements.” 152) Ely underwrote this premise with an
emphasis on judicial independence: constitutional judges, because of
their electoral insularity, are likely to be comparatively resistant to
the majority’s temptation to entrench its political power and to its
occasional tendency toward irrational prejudice; they are “in a
position to objectively assess claims” that these democratic
malfunctions are occurring. 153 In a word, constitutional adjudication
is more impartial than democratic politics on questions of democratic
dysfunction. Judicial decisions on these issues therefore can be more
readily accepted by those subject to them than (potentially selfinterested or biased) democratic resolutions of these claims could be.
To Ely’s invocation of judicial independence, we can add the
observation that the Framing processes are even more insulated than

152. Waldron, Core, supra note 44, at 1371; see supra Part II.D.
153. ELY, supra note 149, at 103.

1317

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

life-tenured judges from contemporary politics. The Framers who
authored and ratified most of the Constitution’s key provisions have
long since died—a weakness of Consent accounts and Framingfocused Moral Guidance accounts, but an advantage on the Footnote
Four approach. Those (now-dead) Framers obviously do not stand to
benefit by entrenching the power of current majorities or officials; as
such, the rules they authored can be seen as relatively impartial
principles for regulating self-interest in current democratic
government.
On the other hand, as I have noted, there is no good reason to
believe that the Framers or their generation were less susceptible
than we are today to the danger of irrational bias against “discrete
and insular minorities.” We might therefore not trust rules laid
down by the Framers to govern disputes regarding the treatment of,
say, racial minorities or women. This fact has implications for the
type of interpretive methodology supported by the Footnote Four
account, as I explain below.

C. Footnote Four and Originalism
The Footnote Four version of a Dispute Resolution account
justifies constitutional authority as a relatively impartial way to
prevent democratic power-entrenchment and bias and to resolve
disputes about whether any given law or policy suffers from these
failures. This approach turns out to provide only limited support for
an originalist interpretive methodology, valuing it in some doctrinal
areas and rejecting it in others. It also allows for (indeed demands)
nonoriginalist interpretation where original meaning runs out. I
discuss each of these implications below.

1. Selective originalism
On the Footnote Four account, there is no special magic in
decisions made by the Framers; the value of deferring to those
decisions lies in the impartiality that flows from that deference, not
in the supposed moral wisdom of the Framing generation or the
super-majoritarian process they employed. This means that a
Footnote Four judge will employ originalist interpretation where it
promotes impartiality and will reject it where it has the opposite
effect.
As I suggested above, deference to the Framers on some
constitutional issues seems likely to promote impartiality.
1318
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Government officials and political majorities have a salient selfinterest in the resolution of disputes involving the potential
entrenchment of their own power. But the Framers and their
generation no longer have any self-interest at stake in these disputes;
they have been dead for decades or centuries. 154 For a contemporary
interpreter to defer to judgments of the Framers on these questions,
then, is to enhance the impartiality, and the appearance of
impartiality, by which these disputes are resolved.
Many important questions in constitutional law fall into this
“potential power-entrenchment” category and thus are candidates
for originalist interpretation. Questions of the scope and nature of
political participation and political influence—involving the right to
vote, for instance, or to engage in political speech, or to seek or hold
office—are obvious examples. So are questions involving the
allocation of power between the different levels and branches of
government, which in American constitutional law typically are
referred to as issues of federalism and separation of powers. Issues of
criminal procedure—the processes by which those in power can
wield the coercive force of the state—fit comfortably in this category.
Indeed the category probably includes process-related questions
more generally, such as the conditions under which government may
choose the winners and losers of regulation (many equal-protection
and so-called “substantive” due-process cases) or take private
property for public use.
These topics comprise much of federal constitutional law in the
United States. But they are far from the whole of it. The Footnote
Four approach suggests a second function for the relative
impartiality of constitutional law: it can protect members of “discrete
and insular” minority groups against irrational majority bias. On this
score, appeal to the judgments of the Framers is likely to be less
useful, as I suggested above. On questions of race or gender
relations, for example, contemporary citizens might perceive at least
as much irrational bias among the eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Framers as among our own generation. Originalism, then,
might be inappropriate in resolving disputes about racial or gender
154. McGinnis and Rappaport suggest that even recent constitutional amendments might
be relatively immune to self-interest by virtue of the super-majority requirement for their
enactment, which simulates a sort of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” See McGinnis & Rappaport,
Good Constitution, supra note 122, at 1708–10; McGinnis & Rappaport, Pragmatic Defense, supra
note 122, at 388–89.
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equality (as indeed the Brown Court suggested when it refused to
“turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment
was adopted” 155), or about other arguable manifestations of equality
(based on sexual orientation, for example) on which the danger of
irrational bias seems at least as great among the Framers as in
contemporary politics. The same point might apply to disputes over
religious freedom or forms of nonpolitical expression (sexual speech,
for example).156
A Footnote Four judge, then, need not be (should not be)
committed to originalism across the board. Instead, she will pick and
choose an originalist methodology as appropriate to enhance the
perceived impartiality of her decisions. Originalism might be more
appropriate in (say) political-speech or federalism cases than in (say)
race-relations or freedom-of-religion cases.

2. Originalism as a starting point
Even where originalism seems an appropriate means of fostering
impartiality, it does not exhaust an interpreter’s options on the
Footnote Four approach. A Framing-focused Moral Guidance
account, remember, equates constitutional authority with judgments
ratified at the Framing; if those judgments run out, so does the
authority of the Constitution. But on the Footnote Four approach,
the judgments of the Framers are only one potential source of
impartiality. Indeed, both the Carolene Products Court and Ely looked
for impartiality not primarily to the Framers, but to the Court and
the adjudicative process of which it is a part. Their arguments
suggest that the political insularity of constitutional judges, and
perhaps the features of legal reasoning more generally (its obsession
with authority, its language of general principle, its requirement of
responsiveness to competing arguments), make constitutional
adjudication a more impartial forum than ordinary politics for
resolving questions of potential entrenchment or bias. 157

155. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
156. There is a significant potential caveat to this suggestion, however. If the Framers can
be shown to have taken a particular position despite their evident bias, deference to that
position can be perceived as impartial. So, for example, if the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not object to race-based affirmative action, despite their demonstrably
benighted views on race by today’s lights, then deferring to that position in resolving a
contemporary dispute about affirmative action might be seen as relatively impartial.
157. Ely himself, following Alexander Hamilton, emphasized the political insularity of

1320

DO NOT DELETE

1251

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

What Lies Beneath

The payoff of this flexibility is that constitutional authority can
exist on the Footnote Four account even if the Framers did not
consider the particular issue being addressed—even, in fact, if the
original meaning of the text does not fully resolve that issue. In such
instances, authority cannot flow from the (nonexistent, or at least
inapplicable) superior wisdom of the Framing. But it might flow
from the relative impartiality of the adjudicative process.
This fact has obvious advantages for those questions (involving
gender or race relations, for example) on which resort to original
meaning would not enhance impartiality. Courts can use
nonoriginalist constitutional interpretation to resolve these issues
relatively impartially and thus authoritatively. But it also bears fruit
in cases (involving political participation, federalism, separation of
powers, etc.) where originalism seems most appropriate. Because
courts, too, are relatively impartial on these questions as compared
to ordinary politics, they can use nonoriginalist methodologies to
resolve them where originalist methodology—the search for
determinate original meaning—fails to do so.
As an example, consider again our legislator Cato’s conundrum
regarding the due-process rights of suspected terrorists. A Framingfocused Moral Guidance account faces two related obstacles to
resolving this question authoritatively. First, there might not be any
original meaning that governs the question. Second, even if there is
an identifiable, controlling original meaning (as we assumed in
assessing the Framing-focused account in Part V.D), there may be no
directly on-point judgment of the Framers regarding these facts or

judges. See ELY, supra note 149, at 101–04; see also Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83.
“Legal Process” theorists of the mid-twentieth century, most prominently Bickel and Herbert
Wechsler, emphasized the prominent role of principle in judicial decision-making, as does the
more-recent work of Ronald Dworkin. See BICKEL, supra note 127, at 23–28; Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW, supra note 130, at 31; DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 22, at 69–71. I have
focused on the requirement of responsiveness in some of my own work. See Christopher J.
Peters, Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8 LEG. THEORY 185 (2002);
Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. L. REV. 1, 20–
21 (2001). Recently Jack Balkin has touched on all of these themes in defending an interpretive
approach he calls “living originalism” (or “framework originalism”). See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 129–37 (2011). Of course, most of these theorists do not consider themselves
Footnote Four adherents; among them, I probably have come closest to endorsing something
like the Footnote Four approach. See PETERS, supra note 42, at 255–72. I think, however, that
many of these theories can be recast in Footnote Four or similar Dispute Resolution terms, as I
suggest infra Part VI.G.
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closely analogous ones. If either of these conditions holds, a
Framing-focused account can supply no authoritative constitutional
law to govern Cato’s case.
Having no authoritative constitutional law to govern a case like
this, or many other cases in which original meaning runs out or no
on-point original judgment exists, is a real problem for a Framingfocused Moral Guidance account. As I discuss in Part VI.E below,
that problem has been exposed by the New Originalist move toward
constitutional “construction” to fill the gaps left open by original
meaning. But the Footnote Four approach avoids this problem
altogether by allowing for authoritative constitutional resolution of
these issues through adjudication. Even where the Framing
generation did not resolve questions like the due-process rights of
terrorism suspects, courts can resolve them in a way that is more
impartial than (self-interested) democratic politics and therefore, on
the Footnote Four account, can be authoritative.
In this sense, even where originalism is appropriate on the
Footnote Four approach, it functions as a starting point, not as the
entirety of the interpretive process. And this is true in another sense
as well. There may be circumstances—even on topics that seem
suitable for originalism—in which an identifiable, on-point original
meaning exists, and yet applying it simply would be unacceptable to
most of those bound by the Constitution. Suppose, for example, that
we determine with reasonable certainty that the original meaning of
the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech prohibited
only prior restraints on speech, not after-the-fact punishments. Or
suppose we establish that the original meaning of Congress’ power
“to regulate Commerce among the several States” encompassed only
the specific acts of buying, selling, and bartering for the purchase or
sale of goods. 158 I think it is quite unlikely that most Americans
today would accept these limits on the freedom of speech or the
regulatory power of Congress. And yet, jettisoning constitutional
standards in these areas altogether would defeat the purpose of
constitutional law (on the Footnote Four approach), which is to

158. Justice Clarence Thomas attributes an original meaning of roughly this scope to the
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–87 (1985) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“At the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”).
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remove these questions from decision by the self-interested majority.
Footnote Four solves the problem by subjecting these issues to
resolution by the still-relatively-impartial judicial process.
The Footnote Four approach, unlike the Framing-focused version
of Moral Guidance, thus allows constitutional adjudication to
supplement, and in some cases perhaps even to supplant, original
meaning where the latter is incomplete or just plain unacceptable. It
probably is no coincidence that this sort of hybrid approach is a
better fit than thoroughgoing originalism with our actual
constitutional practice of utilizing “many pathways of change,” in
Reva Siegel’s phrase. 159

D. The (Relative) Plausibility of Footnote Four
All this is well and good. (Or maybe not so much, if you are a
thoroughgoing originalist.) But it’s only so much ink if the Footnote
Four account turns out to be as flawed as Framing-focused Moral
Guidance and the others I have canvassed. I think Footnote Four is a
substantial improvement over these rivals as an account of
constitutional authority. Which is not to say that it has no
weaknesses.

1. The salient defects of the Framing revisited
Recall, first, the weaknesses in the claim that the moral wisdom
of the Framing was superior, generally speaking, to that of
contemporary democratic politics: the Framing generation made
salient moral errors, and the procedures of the Framing were
arbitrarily exclusionary. These problems are less serious on the
Footnote Four account. What matters to that account is not the
supposed moral wisdom of the Framing, but rather the relative
impartiality it can provide as compared with contemporary
democracy. And the fact that the Framing was exclusionary and in
some ways morally benighted need not affect its relative impartiality.
As we have seen, the Framers’ decisions regarding the scope and
allocation of government power are, when applied to today’s
problems, untainted by self-interest, and this remains true regardless
of the Framers’ attitudes toward (say) race or their exclusion of (say)
women from the constitutional process. Of course, the Framers’

159. Siegel, supra note 106, at 1405.
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views on race or gender undermine their impartiality with respect to
contemporary disputes involving those topics; but this objection can
be addressed on the Footnote Four account by simply avoiding
originalism in deciding these disputes. Because that account derives
constitutional authority from the impartiality, not just of the
Framing, but also of subsequent adjudication, defects in the Framing
need not call the entirety of constitutional authority into question.

2. The problem of unforeseen circumstances revisited
Second, just as constitutional authority on the Footnote Four
account does not depend solely on the Framing, neither does it depend
solely on the existence of some relatively concrete judgment of the
Framers involving the particular circumstances a decision-maker now
faces. The Framing-focused Moral Guidance account is flummoxed by
cases the Framers did not anticipate; it offers no reason to obey
constitutional rules in such cases. But the Footnote Four account offers
a reason for obedience. To obey a rule created by the Framers, even as
applied to a case the Framers did not foresee, is (to that extent) to defer
to a relatively impartial source of decision in that case.
Consider again Cato’s decision whether to obey the Due Process
Clause despite his disagreement with its content in his case. As a
current holder of political power, Cato is self-interested in the
question whether that power can be used to suppress political
opposition. By obeying the Due Process Clause—a rule fashioned by
eighteenth-century Framers with no stake in contemporary political
controversies—Cato can resolve the question impartially, and can be
seen as doing so. His decision thus can be accepted by those who
disagree with it, in a way in which the opposite decision might not
have been.
Obedience to constitutional rules, therefore, can promote
impartiality even when the rule-makers did not consider a particular
case to which the rule applies. And note that the relevant rulemakers, on the Footnote Four account, are much more numerous
than on the Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach. Even if the
Framers did not consider a case like Cato’s, a subsequent Court
might have done so. Cato can resolve his quandary impartially by
deferring to an on-point judicial decision even if there is no closely
on-point original meaning to follow.
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In fact, as I suggested above, 160 the relative impartiality of
constitutional adjudication can bring legitimacy absent any on-point
decision at all. Suppose Cato’s bill becomes law and our hypothetical
judge, Gaius, must determine its constitutionality. Even after looking
at original meaning and precedent, it might be unclear what the Due
Process Clause requires in this case. Whichever answer Gaius
reaches, however, his decision can be perceived as more impartial
than the self-interested actions of Cato and his fellow legislators in
voting for the law. Gaius, as a life-tenured judge who need not worry
about political opposition, has less personal stake in the law than do
Cato and his cohort. Even if Gaius upholds the law, his comparative
impartiality might persuade those who disagree with his decision
nonetheless to accept it as authoritative.
In short, the sources of constitutional authority on the Footnote
Four account are both multiple and relatively abstract. The absence
of a specific decision by the Framers does not frustrate authority on
that account, unlike on a Framing-focused Moral Guidance approach,
both because there are other relatively impartial decision-makers
available—previous Courts, or the Court deciding the issue at
hand—and because impartiality might flow from obedience to a
general rule established by the Framers or a prior Court even if there
is no specific on-point decision.

3. The problem of disagreement revisited
Finally, a person’s substantive disagreement with a
constitutional command need not undermine the perceived authority
of that command on the Footnote Four approach. We can agree that
a process is impartial without agreeing with the substantive result
that process generates. More to the point, a belief that a result is
wrong need not undermine our faith in the impartiality of the
process that produced it.
On a Moral Guidance approach, remember, Cato’s disagreement
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause in his case serves
as a reason to question the basis of the Clause’s authority, namely
the supposedly superior moral wisdom of the process that created
the Clause. On the Footnote Four account, in contrast, Cato’s
disagreement with the Clause need not affect his belief in the

160. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text.
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Clause’s authority at all. That authority flows from relative
impartiality, not from moral wisdom, and the fact that a process
generates a morally disagreeable result is not (necessarily) a reason
to question its impartiality. Cato’s view that the Clause is (in his
case) wrong need not imply that the Framing that created the
Clause, or the subsequent Courts that have interpreted it, lacked
impartiality.
The same holds true for a judge like Gaius who must decide
whether to enforce the Clause—but with a wrinkle. While Cato is a
part of the democratic political process, Gaius is himself a part of the
constitutional process whose supposed impartiality justifies
imposing constitutional law on democratic politics. For Gaius,
therefore, there are two aspects to the question of constitutional
authority: whether he himself has a duty to obey the Constitution in
making his decision, and whether others will perceive a duty to obey
his decision once it is made. Like Cato, Gaius can disagree with the
substance of the Due Process Clause and still, on a Footnote Four
approach, decide to obey the Clause on the ground that it derives
from a relatively impartial process. And by demonstrably obeying the
Clause in his decision—by convincingly tying that decision to some
decision of the Framers or of a predecessor Court, for example—
Gaius can advertise his impartiality to others and thus can persuade
others to obey the interpretation he renders.
At bottom, then, the Footnote Four account is more plausible
than the Framing-focused version of Moral Guidance. Its
requirements for constitutional authority, both generally and at the
level of particular cases, are less demanding and thus more likely to
be satisfied in practice. And it does not undermine itself by making a
person’s disagreement with the content of the law a reason to
question the law’s authority.

4. A caveat
All is not entirely rosy with Footnote Four, however. It seems
likely that substance—that is, the moral content of constitutional
law—will turn out to be relevant at some level on that account. This
likelihood resurrects the specter of disagreement and its potential to
undermine constitutional authority. But the specter does not seem
quite so frightening on the Footnote Four account as on Moral
Guidance approaches.
Substance, first of all, might be seen as relevant to impartiality. If
constitutional procedures consistently generate one-sided results—
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always favoring the government, say—at some point citizens will
reasonably question the supposed impartiality of those procedures.
So it is possible that a person’s disagreement with a constitutional
command will serve as evidence, for that person, that the
constitutional process is not so impartial after all—and thus that she
has no obligation to obey it.
I believe this possibility is less threatening to the Footnote Four
account, however, than the analogous possibility is to a Moral
Guidance account. On the latter account, one’s disagreement with
the substance of a command is direct evidence against the moral
wisdom of the constitutional process—that is, against its claim to
authority. On Footnote Four, though, one’s disagreement with the
substance of a command is only indirect evidence against the
impartiality, and thus the authority, of the process. That a procedure
is wrong does not necessarily imply that the procedure is partial.
Absent non-substantive evidence of partiality—some salient
favoritism in the relevant procedures, for example—it will take a
pattern of incorrect results, all in the same direction (for the
government, say), to constitute strong evidence of partiality. And
remember that the impartiality question is a comparative one: the
constitutional process need not be perfectly impartial, just impartial
enough as compared to ordinary politics to be capable of resolving
certain disputes.
It also is possible, though, that substance will matter without
regard to impartiality. Even a procedure that is accepted as
sufficiently impartial might still be rejected on the ground that it is
not sufficiently likely to produce substantively good results.
(Consider a coin toss—a perfectly impartial procedure that few
would endorse for important decisions, simply because a fiftypercent accuracy rate will not be viewed as high enough.) In other
words, we might also care about the competence of a disputeresolution procedure, not just its impartiality. 161 If so, then the
specter of substantive disagreement reappears, threatening to
undercut the perceived authority of a command someone thinks is
substantively wrong.
Again, however, this threat seems less severe than on a MoralGuidance account, for two related reasons. First, competence is not
the primary basis of authority on the Footnote Four approach; it

161. On this point, considered in the context of legal authority generally, see PETERS, supra
note 42, at 75–78.
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operates more as a side constraint, disqualifying suitably impartial
procedures that are simply too incompetent to be acceptable. Doubts
about a procedure’s competence might be overcome by
demonstrations of its superior impartiality. On a Moral Guidance
account, however, competence—the possession of superior moral
wisdom—is the raison d’être of constitutional authority. Doubts about
the Constitution’s superior wisdom go to the very heart of its
authority; there is no other factor to outweigh them.
Second, while impartiality is assessed comparatively on the
Footnote Four account, competence is not. Constitutional
procedures must be considerably more impartial on the relevant
questions than the ordinary democratic alternatives. But they need
not be considerably more competent than those alternatives.
Competence, again, is a side constraint; impartiality drives
constitutional authority on Footnote Four.
So someone who disagrees with a constitutional command is less
likely to reject its authority for that reason, I think, on the Footnote
Four account than on a Moral Guidance account. This does not mean
the problem of substantive disagreement is trivial or nonexistent on
Footnote Four. But it suggests, especially given the other advantages
of that approach, that the Footnote Four version of Dispute
Resolution is the best account available to justify constitutional
authority.

E. “Interpretation” vs. “Construction” Revisited
I argued in Part VI.C above that a Footnote Four account
strengthens, or perhaps broadens, the authority of constitutional law
by making authority possible in cases where it is missing on the
Framing-focused approach: cases where original meaning runs out or
where, even if original meaning is determinate, the Framers did not
foresee the particular circumstances at hand. This point is
independently interesting, because it reveals a significant problem
with the New Originalist distinction between constitutional
“interpretation” and constitutional “construction” that I discussed in
Part III.A.
In New Originalist terminology, remember, “interpretation” is
the process of determining the (original) meaning of the
Constitution’s text and “construction” is the process of resolving a
case that is not determinately resolved by this (original) meaning.
The distinction is a step in the right direction for originalism, as it
acknowledges the need to resolve the (many) constitutional cases in
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which the text alone is underdeterminate. But the distinction begs
an important question: where does a court’s authority to engage in
“construction” come from?
We have now canvassed (most of) the accounts of constitutional
authority that might be thought to support originalism. 162 What is
remarkable is that none of them, with the exception of Footnote
Four (which entails only modest, selective originalism), can
authorize constitutional construction, even assuming the account
itself is valid.
Barnett’s Values Imposition account purports to justify the
authority of constitutional interpretation—identification of original
meaning—on the ground that the Framers acted to enshrine the
correct principles of natural justice. But courts are not the Framers.
There is no guarantee that a court engaging in construction—moving
beyond original meaning—will protect natural rights, or even
attempt to do so. And so there is no basis for obedience to judicial
constructions of the Constitution on Barnett’s account. (Unless, that
is, Barnett is willing to claim that courts, or at least the Supreme
Court, have a special ability and inclination to protect natural rights,
which would be a form of Court-focused Moral Guidance account. In
any event, Barnett does not make such a claim to my knowledge.)
Similarly, a Consent account holds that “the People” who framed
the Constitution have legitimate authority over subsequent
generations acting through normal politics. But the Court is not the
People; an act of judicial construction of the Constitution is not an
act of popular sovereignty. So judicial constructions cannot be
authoritative on a Consent approach.
For its part, a Framing-focused Moral Guidance account derives
authority from the supposedly superior moral wisdom of the
Framing. As we’ve seen, that authority runs out when the Framers’
judgments run out—for instance, when there is no determinate
original meaning. But that is precisely where the process of judicial
construction is supposed to begin. Where does the authority of that
process come from?
The analysis so far suggests there are only two potential sources
of authority for judicial construction. One is a Court-focused variety
of Moral Guidance—a theory that the superior wisdom of

162. “Most of,” because one type of account remains to be addressed: what I call a Rule of

Law account. See infra Part VI.H.

1329

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

adjudication can pick up the slack where the (even-more-superior)
wisdom of the Framing gives out. I am not aware of an originalist
who has taken this approach or of a Court-focused Moral Guidance
theorist who has endorsed anything like strong originalism. A theory
holding that both the Framing and the Court are morally wiser than
the ordinary democratic process might be too much to take. 163
The other possibility is a Footnote Four approach. Judges engage
in construction because they need to do so to resolve cases, and
because it is better to resolve certain cases through (relatively
impartial) constitutional procedures then to leave them to be
“resolved,” with partiality, by ordinary politics. Of course, an
acknowledgment that judges can make constitutional law
authoritatively, without rigid originalist methodology, would raise
the question of just what originalism buys us in the first place. If
Footnote Four can justify construction, why can’t it justify
interpretation too? And if it can justify interpretation, the
interpretation it justifies will, as we have seen, be only selectively
originalist.
To put the point bluntly: Footnote Four looks like the best
available normative grounding for what New Originalists call
constitutional construction. And this fact calls into question the
existence of any other normative grounding for constitutional
interpretation in the New Originalist sense. It cannot be the case that
the best method of constitutional interpretation is entailed by one
theory of constitutional authority and the best method of
constitutional construction by an entirely different theory. If
interpretation and construction are both legitimately authoritative
procedures, then we must locate a single plausible theory of
authority that is capable of justifying both of them.

F. The Jurisdictional Problem
There is at least one more reason to prefer Footnote Four over
Framing-focused Moral Guidance, which appears to be its closest
rival. The reason is that Footnote Four can delineate the

163. An adherent of the Cynical Narrative presented in Part II.B might hypothesize that
originalists shy away from Court-focused accounts because of the origins of contemporary
originalism—as a device to critique liberal rulings of the Warren and early Burger Courts.
Extolling the superior moral wisdom of the judicial process would sit uncomfortably alongside
claims that the judicial process has produced many unwarranted “activist” results.
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jurisdictional boundaries of constitutional law while Framingfocused accounts cannot.
Recall that Framing-focused accounts necessarily attribute to the
Framers (or to the Framing process more generally) an extremely
broad moral wisdom—broad enough to explain the authority, not
just of what the Framers put into the Constitution, but also of what
the Framers left out of it. 164 This breadth is problematic, not only
because it seems implausible as a descriptive matter, but also
because it implies a virtually unlimited scope of potential
constitutional authority. The Framers (arguably) did not include
rights to education or health care in the Constitution. But had they
chosen to include those rights in the document, that choice would
have been authoritative—just as their choice not to include them is
authoritative in fact.
If this is true of the (hypothetical) rights to education and health
care, it is true of virtually anything—of any imaginable constitutional
rule or command on any imaginable subject. (It is true, at least, of
any command on any subject that could have been thought of by the
Framers.) The Framers could have included a right to pet ownership
in the Constitution, and we would be bound by that right. The
Framers could have required members of Congress to wear silly
paper hats, and we would be bound by that requirement. (In fact,
many people think that some of the provisions the Framers did
include in the Constitution—the Electoral College, 165 the naturalborn citizenship requirement to be President, 166 equal state
representation in the Senate 167—are nearly this ridiculous.) Thus
there is no discernible limit to the content of constitutional law on a
Framing-focused account. Put another way, there is no subject to
which the Constitution’s potential jurisdiction does not extend.
This might not seem like a real problem, given that the content
of the Constitution is limited; the Framers did not in fact include a
requirement that congressmen wear silly hats. But it might become a
problem if we take seriously the New Originalists’
interpretation/construction distinction. That distinction recognizes
the authority of judges to, in essence, create constitutional law

164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra Part V.D.1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2–4; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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beyond the confines of original meaning. And while there are a
number of New Originalist theories about how judges should
exercise that authority, there is no agreement on the point. 168 So it
is conceivable that even an originalist judge, engaging in
construction, could go far beyond the content imagined by the
Framers and add something unprecedented, even radical, to
constitutional law—perhaps not a silly-hats requirement, but maybe
a right to, well, education or health care. 169 And while originalists
might perhaps devise theories of construction that would prevent
this, nothing in the grounding of constitutional authority itself
would do so.
Consider also the question of what might legitimately be added
to the Constitution, not by judicial construction, but through the
formal Article V amendment process. Was it legitimate (albeit
unwise) to constitutionalize Prohibition via the Eighteenth
Amendment? 170 Would it be legitimate (wise or not) to add an
amendment prohibiting flag-burning? An amendment prohibiting
(or guaranteeing the right to) same-sex marriage? Moral Guidance
accounts have no answers to these questions; they can provide no
theory of the proper jurisdiction of constitutional law.
Footnote Four, in contrast, implies a theory of constitutional
jurisdiction. On that account, the Constitution’s authority is
grounded in the relative impartiality of the constitutional process
with respect to certain kinds of issues—issues where there is reason
to suspect entrenched bias in democratic politics. While there will
almost always be room to argue about whether particular issues fall
within this set, the set is not infinite, and there are governing
principles for deciding what is inside it and what is not. Ely himself,
for example, thought that Roe v. Wade was illegitimate because it
could not be justified as a representation-reinforcing measure. 171 I
can’t think of a plausible Footnote Four argument justifying the
Eighteenth Amendment, or amendments banning flag-burning or
same-sex marriage. (I can think of one for an amendment allowing

168. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 76–79.
169. Again, Lawrence Sager makes a reasonable argument that these kinds of rights can be
implied from the constitutional text. See SAGER, supra note 129, at 84–92, 129–60.
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI.
171. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973).
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same-sex marriage—one based on the stigma attached to its denial—
though it is hardly a slam-dunk. 172)
Again, there is room for debate on (most of) these issues. But
Footnote Four gives us an analytical framework with which to
engage in those debates. Moral Guidance requires us to throw up our
hands and say “anything goes.”

G. Moral Guidance or Dispute Resolution?
So far I have been writing as if the Moral Guidance and Dispute
Resolution approaches are mutually contradictory. Of course they
are not; one might attempt to justify constitutional law on both
grounds, although this might seem like overkill. More modestly, a
single approach might be understood, in the alternative, as grounded
either in Moral Guidance or in Dispute Resolution. And in fact a
number of prominent accounts of constitutional law can be read this
way.
Consider Hamilton’s arguments for the authority of the
Constitution generally (the “solemn and authoritative act” that
trumps the “momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics) 173 and
judicial review in particular (“the independence of the judges” that
protects rights against occasional “ill humors . . . among the
people”). 174 These points easily can be recast as asserting, not the
superior moral wisdom of the Framing or of the adjudicative process,
but rather the comparative impartiality of those processes. Hamilton,
that is, might reasonably be understood as a nascent Footnote Four
theorist, not a Moral Guidance theorist. 175
We can perform the same shift in perspective to read the
“democratic dualism” of Bruce Ackerman as a kind of Footnote Four
theory, exalting “higher lawmaking” not for its extraordinary
judgment but for its exceptional fairness. 176 Court-focused theories

172. For some thoughts on the jurisdictional limits of constitutional law under a
somewhat expanded version of Footnote Four, with particular reference to Roe and other
“substantive” due process decisions, see PETERS, supra note 42, at 267–72.
173. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440; see supra text accompanying note 119.
174. Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 440; see supra text accompanying note 126.
175. And not a Consent theorist either, though elements of his rhetoric in The Federalist
would support a consensualist reading. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
176. In We the People: Foundations, Ackerman mentions Ely only twice, and then rather
dismissively. See ACKERMAN, supra note 85, at 7, 9. He extensively analyzes the actual Footnote
Four of Carolene Products as an example of judicial “synthesis,” see id. at 119–30, but does not
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might be reread in this way as well: the special “capacities for
dealing with matters of principle” that Alexander Bickel and others
(Eisgruber, Sager, Dworkin) attribute to courts 177 might consist
primarily of impartiality rather than wisdom.
This is not to say that any of these theorists would endorse, or
would have endorsed, the Footnote Four approach, or that every
aspect of each of their theories is consistent with it. But it is to
suggest another point in favor of Footnote Four: it is a relatively
“Catholic” approach, adaptable to different particular arguments
about the nature of the Framing or of adjudication.

H. The Rule of Law
Finally, I need to engage with a sort of Dispute Resolution
account that might be thought to support relatively strong
originalism. Lawrence Solum cites as a “familiar justification for
originalism” the “great value of the rule of law and its associated
values, predictability, certainty, and stability of legal rules.” 178 This
suggests what we might call a Rule of Law account of constitutional
authority: obedience to the Constitution is required in order to serve
these rule-of-law values.
We can understand the Rule of Law account as a type of Dispute
Resolution account, one that is very close to the basic Hobbesian
narrative. Disagreement about what should be done, including
disagreement about what the law is, undermines “predictability,
certainty, and stability.” Obedience to the Constitution avoids this
costly disagreement, and (the suggestion goes) originalist
interpretation of the Constitution enhances its capacity for disputeavoidance. 179
The Rule of Law account thus emerges as a potential alternative
to Footnote Four within the Dispute Resolution spectrum. Note
that, as a type of Dispute Resolution account, the Rule of Law
shares—perhaps even improves upon—Footnote Four’s conceptual
advantages as an account of constitutional authority. It provides a

address the potential implications of its framework for the question of constitutional authority.
Indeed, Ackerman is noncommittal and difficult to decipher on the question of authority. At
bottom, I can find nothing in his arguments that rules out reading them as expressions of a
Footnote Four view of authority.
177. BICKEL, supra note 127, at 25; see supra text accompanying notes 127–130.
178. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 129.
179. For a general Dispute Resolution account of these rule-of-law values, see PETERS,
supra note 42, at 107–19.
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content-independent reason to obey constitutional law, namely the
furtherance of predictability, certainty, and stability. It is not vitiated
by the salient moral defects of the Framing: so long as the Framing
generates predictable, certain, stable legal rules, it is irrelevant (on
the Rule of Law account) how those rules were created. It is not
frustrated by circumstances the Framers did not foresee: so long as a
rule clearly applies to a case, it doesn’t matter that the Framers did
not anticipate that case. And—an apparent advantage over Footnote
Four—the Rule of Law rationale is not undermined in the least by
the inevitability of substantive disagreement with the Constitution’s
commands. Competence is irrelevant to the rule-of-law values; all
that matters is clarity.
There are two difficulties with the Rule of Law account as a
defense of originalism, however. First and most importantly, the
account (by itself) is unpersuasive as a justification of broad
constitutional authority. Second, the account does not in fact entail
originalism.

1. Hobbes redux
The Rule of Law account shares with the bare Hobbesian
approach the view that it is more important that things be decided
than that things be decided correctly. 180 With respect to some
aspects of constitutional law, this position seems unassailable. We
need a foundational set of legal rules to, literally, constitute
democracy—to specify basics like who makes, enforces, and
interprets the laws, and how. 181 These constitutive rules cannot
continually be up for debate—otherwise democratic government
could not function. It would be like trying to play a baseball game
while the teams fight over how many strikes make an out. At the
foundational, constitutive level, the “predictability, certainty, and
stability of legal rules” is indeed at a premium.
At some point, however, it ceases to be more important to have
rules than to have rules that are correct, or at least correctly made.
Once basic democratic government is up and running, after all, we

180. On the bare Hobbesian approach, see supra notes 143–146 and accompanying text; see
also PETERS, supra note 42, at 57–61, 119–22.
181. On this point, see EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 12 (citing STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS
AND CONSTRAINTS 167–69 (1995)); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS DO 98 (2001); PETERS, supra note 42, at 243–46.
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(the participants in that democracy) can make our own rules,
democratically, to bring predictability, certainty, and stability to our
world. Some additional justification is necessary if we are to
continue subjugating our own rule-making authority to some
supposedly higher, constitutional power.
To be clear: the point here is not that the rule-of-law values cease
to matter once the constitutive elements of working democracy are
in place. The point is that those values by themselves become
inadequate to justify constitutional law once that occurs. Once
democracy itself is constituted sufficiently to make its own laws,
those (democratically created) laws can begin to fulfill the rule-oflaw functions. We need some additional reason to think that
(predictable, certain, stable) democratically created laws should be
trumped by (predictable, certain, stable) constitutional commands.
The Rule of Law account, by itself, cannot supply a persuasive
reason, any more than Hobbes could persuasively explain why an
absolutist monarchy was better than a democratic process for
making laws. Of course, the greater the extent to which controversial
issues are governed by rigid, difficult-to-change constitutional rules,
the less democratic fighting there will be about these issues. In this
sense, constitutional law might bring more predictability, certainty,
and stability than ordinary democracy. But the same is true of
Hobbesian absolutism, and yet, following Locke, Jefferson, and many
others, we prefer democracy. Once the basic democratic ground rules
are in place, it becomes, to us, more important that our laws be
made in a way we find acceptable than that they simply exist,
regardless of how they are made.
Footnote Four offers a theory of why constitutional law is, on
some topics, more acceptable than ordinary democracy. The Rule of
Law account offers no such theory. It is unpersuasive as a
justification of constitutional law beyond the bare-bones form
necessarily to constitute democracy in a literal sense.

2. Originalism and underdeterminacy
Even if the Rule of Law account could justify constitutional
authority, it would not entail originalism, at least not to a greater
extent than the Footnote Four account entails it. This is because, as
we have seen numerous times already, originalism is an endemically
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underdeterminate methodology. 182 The New Originalist distinction
between “interpretation” and “construction” acknowledges that
original meaning often, in Solum’s phrase, “runs out.” 183 When this
occurs, the rule-of-law values of predictability, certainty, and stability
are threatened. Like Footnote Four, the Rule of Law account
suggests that sources of law besides original meaning—principally
case-by-case judicial decision-making—will be necessary to fill the
resulting gaps in determinacy (on the Rule of Law account) or
impartiality (on the Footnote Four account).
Indeed, originalism might be even less determinate than New
Originalists acknowledge. The problem is not simply that the
Constitution’s text frequently is vague or ambiguous, 184 but that it
often will be very difficult to identify any reliable original meaning at
all. David Strauss helpfully classifies the troubles here into three
categories: “the problem of ascertainability, which is simply the
difficulty of doing the historical research needed to figure out what
the original understandings were”; 185 “the problem of
indeterminacy,” that is, the risk that members of the Framing
generation had “different understandings about what the words have
committed the document to”; 186 and “the problem of translation,” or
the difficulty of applying the particular understandings of the
Framing generation to modern circumstances they could not have
foreseen. 187 An originalist interpreter must, first, locate relevant
historical evidence regarding what the appropriate collection of
people alive at the time of the Framing thought or intended the
Constitution’s words to mean (and in so doing must decide what
evidence is relevant, which collection of people is appropriate, and
what understandings or beliefs or other mental states of those
people matter). She must then determine whether some of the
relevant mental states of some of the people in question are in
conflict and, if so, what to do about it. And she must, finally, figure
out how to apply those mental states—which were formed with

182. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.; supra text accompanying notes 63–72.
183. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 8, at 69.
184. A fact readily admitted by New Originalists. See id. at 69–74; BARNETT, LOST
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 118–21; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 7, 209–12.
185. David Strauss, Remarks, Panel on Originalism and Precedent, in ORIGINALISM, supra note
10, at 199, 218.
186. Id.
187. Id.

1337

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

reference to facts as they existed in the late eighteenth or midnineteenth centuries—to the very different and unforeseen facts as
they exist today. In light of these obstacles, we might think Justice
Scalia is understating the matter when he admits that originalist
methodology “is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive.” 188
Of course, if the rule-of-law values are behind at least the
fundamental constitutive law of our democracy, then we need some
relatively
determinate
methodology
for
identifying
and
understanding those rules. So it is no accident that many or most of
the basic constitutive rules in our own Constitution are expressed
using such determinate language that further interpretation is
superfluous or nearly so. The power to make law is “vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate,” 189
“composed of two Senators from each State” 190 serving terms of “six
Years,” 191 “and [a] House of Representatives,” 192 “composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States” 193 and “apportioned among the several States . . .
according to their respective Numbers . . . not [to] exceed one for
every thirty Thousand.” 194 The power to execute the law is “vested
in a President” who “shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years.” 195 And so on.
In the end, a Rule of Law account can take us only so far. It can
justify bare-bones constitutive rules of democracy but not
constitutional law more generally. And it cannot justify anything
approaching a thoroughgoing originalism, for the simple reason that
originalist interpretation is inadequate to serve the rule-of-law
values.
VII. CONCLUSION: ECHOES OF THE CYNICAL NARRATIVE
Let’s review. Methodologies of constitutional interpretation beg
for theories of constitutional authority. I have argued here, in fact,

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 12, at 864.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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that methodology presupposes an account of authority. Without an
account of why the Constitution binds us, any approach to
interpretation is bound to seem opportunistic, even cynical—an
attempt to foist political results on the public in the name of
constitutional law.
I have argued also that the accounts of authority offered (or,
often, assumed) by originalists prove unpersuasive. The pursuit of
particular substantive values—“natural rights,” for example—is not a
justification of authority at all; it is a question-begging sermon that
will convert no one but the choir. The ideas that we have consented
to an originalist Constitution, or that such a Constitution is an act of
“popular sovereignty” that somehow binds us, stretch the concepts
of “consent” and “sovereignty” beyond recognition. The notion that
the Framing generated special moral wisdom that we cannot now
hope to duplicate is both descriptively implausible and conceptually
problematic. The rule-of-law values of predictability, certainty, and
stability justify skeletal constitutional law at most, and they demand
more determinacy than originalist methodology alone can provide.
What is left is the Footnote Four account of constitutional
authority—not a flawless account, to be sure, but a substantial
improvement over its rivals. The problem for originalists is that
Footnote Four can support only a selective, truncated form of
originalism. This is not nothing; the idea that originalism is
justifiable in any form at all might come as a surprise to some
nonoriginalists. But it is not the sort of thoroughgoing originalism
that the progenitors of contemporary originalism seem to have had
in mind, 196 and it probably is not even the kind of presumptive
originalism that New Originalists advocate—an originalism that is
always the first resort and that often is sufficient to resolve
constitutional cases.
If New Originalists want thicker ice to skate on, they need to do
more to develop a convincing account of constitutional authority that
also entails the methodology they endorse. I am skeptical that such
an account is available, but New Originalist theory has proven
remarkably imaginative. Unless and until this happens, originalists
might find it difficult to escape the echoes of the Cynical Narrative—
the lingering suspicion that their methodology is just a sophisticated
cover for controversial political commitments.
196. See sources cited supra note 10.
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